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Abstract
In a large sample of countries across different geographic regions and
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fects of central bank transparency on forecast accuracy and their dispersion
among a large set of professional forecasts of financial and macroeconomic
variables. More communication even increases forecast errors and disper-
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1 Introduction
Until not so long ago, central bankers believed that monetary policy decisions
should take the markets by surprise in order to achieve maximum impact. In
the last two decades, there has been a shift to a policy of increasing transparency
with respect to goals, strategies and the basis on which decisions are made. This
development is closely linked to increased central bank independence (CBI),
which calls for a counterbalance in the form of transparency and accountability.
Economic benefits are deemed another key reason for enhanced transparency.
As summarized by Freedman & Laxton (2009), it is generally believed in the
central banking community that providing more information about monetary
policy may increase its effectiveness. This view is based on theoretical and em-
pirical research that emphasizes the importance of expectations about monetary
policy as a key element in determining interest rates and other asset prices.1 By
bringing market behavior in line with monetary policy objectives, the likelihood
of sharply differing views on policy actions is reduced. In turn, more certainty
about when the central bank will set the policy rate and its magnitude can re-
duce the volatility of market interest rates, increase the central bank’s leverage
over longer-term interest rates, and smoothen the incorporation of policy actions
into asset prices. Similarly, Blinder (2007) argues that the major purpose of com-
municating with the markets is to condition expectations about future monetary
policy.
To transmit the views of the central bank to the public and to markets, an im-
provement in the effectiveness of monetary policy through greater transparency
requires proactive and well-planned communication. Hence, a great deal of at-
tention has been paid to the way central banks present their key messages (for
instance, Blinder et al. (2008) and Haldane (2017)). It is expected that central
banks will communicate more actively after than before the crisis (Blinder et al.
(2016)).
Parallel to the shifts in the practice of central banking towards more frequent
communication and greater transparency, an expanding body of literature has
emerged. In theory, both positive and negative effects are likely. Empirical
work has been focused on inflation, financial markets, or private forecasts. A
general finding is that transparency and communication reduce volatility in fi-
1 Survey forecasts are an approximation for expectations in an economy.
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nancial markets, enhance the predictability of upcoming rate decisions, and help
achieve the monetary policy goals, vindicating the switch to greater openness in
central banking.
Our paper contributes specifically to the empirical relation between transparency,
communication, central bank design and private forecasts. In a broader context,
we provide empirical results for the theoretical literature on the social value of
information (see, for instance, Morris & Shin (2002), Hellwig & Veldkamp (2009),
and Lorenzoni (2010)).
We run panel regressions to examine whether increased transparency and inten-
sified communication by central banks affect the quality and the cross-sectional
distribution of forecasts. The question posed is closest to those of Middeldorp
(2011), Dovern et al. (2012), Ehrmann et al. (2012), Neuenkirch (2013), and Nas-
zodi et al. (2016). However, we extend the analysis along various important
dimensions and provide compelling evidence that is in contrast with the litera-
ture.
i We are the first to document an increase in the number of speeches held by
central banks over time using the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
central bankers’ speeches database. Based on it we compiled a new measure
of central bank communication. It measures communication directly and
comprehensively by the number of speeches. The number of speeches allows
us to question the benefits of intensive central bank communication. We in-
terpret a speech as a signal sent by the central bank. The more signals, the
more precise and accurate should forecasts be. The theoretical foundation
is a Bayesian expectations framework. Previous work makes no clear dis-
tinction between transparency and communication or focuses only on single
aspects of communication.
ii We highlight an econometric issue in the estimation method that does not
seem to have been recognized in the literature, and we offer an accurate
alternative. The issue is that residuals follow a pattern when the dependent
variable (either absolute cross-sectional mean forecast error or cross-sectional
standard deviation) is not taken in log. There is a clear-cut lower bound to
the value residuals assume in the setting without log.
iii We create an exceptionally large panel of 73 countries from all world regions
and observations from 1998 to 2014 for financial and macroeconomic data.
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The question is whether there is a one-size-fits-all policy for central bank
communication and transparency. Unlike previous studies, which have in
common a limited number of advanced economies (at most around 30) and
relatively short periods of observations and forecast variables, the data set
we compiled allows us to widen the scope of the inquiry in terms of the
number of countries, their heterogeneity, the period of investigation and the
variables to be forecasted.
iv Our data set also allows us to account for several important economic events,
such as the Great Moderation, the financial crisis and the global recession,
as well as the substantial modifications to central bank practices in their
wake, in particular forward guidance. We also analyze the effect of inflation
targeting and central bank independence.
v We compute optimal levels of transparency.
Overall, the evidence presented in this paper suggests a more balanced con-
clusion about the merits of communication and transparency in enhancing the
predictability of monetary policy than has been reported in the literature.
First, the evidence for communication is uniform and quite compelling: more-
frequent communication increases both forecast errors and their dispersion. The
increased central bank communication seems to have resulted in cacophony and
did not help investors and academics improve their macroeconomic forecasts.
We link this result with the discussion about optimal monetary policy commit-
tees’ size and form.
Second, while more-frequent communication increases both forecast errors and
their dispersion, we find hardly any evidence, in contrast to previous papers,
that transparency improves the accuracy of private forecasts. At best, the impact
is ambiguous. However, if it is significant, transparency tends to reduce the fore-
cast heterogeneity of interest rates, yields, and especially inflation. In general,
the results depend strongly on the country region and the variable underlying
the forecast. A detailed analysis of the various transparency dimensions yields
interesting insights. Greater procedural transparency makes interest rate fore-
casts less accurate in Eastern Europe. At an even higher level of detail, we find
that the publication of voting records makes interest rate forecasts more inaccu-
rate, particularly in Western countries, and a prompt announcement of the main
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operating instrument or target increases the inaccuracy of yield forecasts.
Third, additional analysis provides information about other factors that have an
effect on the precision and distribution of forecasts. i) The zero-lower-bound con-
straint tends to reduce forecast errors and the dispersion of short-term rates, but
it has no effect on yield forecasts. ii) By contrast, the political and institutional
framework in which central banks operate yields contradictory results. While
central bank instability is associated with less-accurate forecasts and with in-
creased dispersion, central bank independence does not exhibit uniform effects,
partly reducing forecast inaccuracy but mostly increasing it. iii) More uniform
is the evidence pertaining to inflation targeting, which yields more-accurate and
more-homogeneous inflation forecasts, more homogeneity in interest rate fore-
casts and, in Western countries, enhanced alignment of yield forecasts. iv) The
next set of results is related to explicit forward guidance, as adopted by some
central banks in the follow-up to the financial crisis. The results show that for-
ward guidance gave rise to less-accurate yield forecasts in Eastern Europe but
reduced the heterogeneity of interest rate forecasts in Western countries.
Fourth, our calculation of the optimal transparency level for interest rate fore-
casts shows that in 2014, 20 central banks had a transparency level corresponding
to the optimum, while 30 were above (including 16 euro area countries) and 23
below the optimal level.
We add to the robustness of the evidence by confirming it across a variety of ad-
ditional analyses, including distinguishing between effects in 3- and 12-month
scenarios and between countries with higher and lower transparency levels, the
exclusion of all euro area countries but Germany, and alternative measures of
uncertainty.
A caveat is in order. Whether more or less communication or whether the de-
gree of transparency should be increased or lowered cannot be definitely an-
swered in our framework. Our paper only studies the effect of communication
and transparency on forecast accuracy and dispersion. Although the impact of
communication and transparency on this dimension is important, there may be
many other beneficial (or harmful) effects of giving public speeches or being
transparent on, for instance, accountability, the public’s understanding of mon-
etary policy, and trust in the central bank.
5
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the re-
lated literature. Section 3 describes the data underlying the empirical analysis.
In Section 4, we explain our estimation strategy and present the results. Sec-
tion 5 offers a series of robustness checks. Section 6 discusses possible policy
implications. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
There exists a large body of literature on the effects of central bank transparency,
communication and optimal central bank design.2 The empirical evidence sug-
gests overall beneficial effects. One branch of literature analyzes the effect of
transparency on the predictability of monetary policy in the financial markets.
A number of studies suggest that increased monetary policy transparency may
have contributed to an increased ability of financial markets to forecast future
monetary policy actions. Most of this research has used information from the
Treasury Bill markets, the markets for Federal Funds and Eurodollar futures,
and it focuses on a relatively short-run horizon, from one day out to six months.
Three approaches have been pursued. One approach investigates the reaction of
market prices to central bank decisions. Little reaction means the decision has
been priced in correctly, suggesting high predictability. Evidence has been re-
ported on this topic (see, for instance, Ranaldo & Rossi (2010) and Wilhelmsen &
Zaghini (2011)). The second approach is based on the accuracy of expectations
priced into the yield curve or futures. Here, too, findings suggest that trans-
parency leads to improved predictability (for instance, Kuttner (2001), Lange
et al. (2003)). The third approach examines forecasts and/or the determinants of
disagreement among forecasters. Swanson (2006) finds that with the increased
transparency of the Federal Reserve, the private sector forecasts of interest rates
have become more precise, both by improving the average quality of forecasts
and by reducing their dispersion across forecasters. In line with this, Sellon
(2008) finds that more-explicit guidance on interest rates led to an improvement
in private sector forecasts.
2 See Van Der Cruijsen et al. (2010) for an overview of the transparency literature, Blinder et al.
(2008) for a survey on communication, Geraats (2006) for an overview of the practice of mone-
tary policy transparency, and Blinder (2004) for central bank design.
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The evidence stretches beyond the US. Middeldorp (2011) analyzes the connec-
tion between the transparency and predictability of short-term interest rates for
24 countries between 1998 and 2005. Higher transparency lowers the errors pri-
vate agents make in forecasting short-term interest at the 3-month horizon, and
it lowers the standard deviation. Dovern et al. (2012) investigate determinants of
disagreement in expectations of seven key economic indicators in the G7 coun-
tries from 1989 to 2006. In line with the literature (Mankiw et al. (2003)), the
measure of cross-sectional dispersion is the inter-quartile range of forecasts in a
given country and month. While disagreement about economic activity intensi-
fies strongly during recessions, disagreement about prices is considerably lower
under independence of the central bank.3 Based also on the inter-quartile range
of forecasts, Ehrmann et al. (2012) examine whether transparency and commu-
nication have led to more-aligned views in the forecasts of macroeconomic vari-
ables in 12 advanced economies from 1990 to 2008. While transparency and
communication reduce dispersion among professional forecasts, there is some
evidence of diminishing marginal effects of increases in (economic) transparency.
Naszodi et al. (2016) expand the analysis of Ehrmann et al. (2012) by enlarging
the panel to 26 countries and by assessing both the degree of forecasting dis-
agreement and its accuracy. Their results suggest that transparency results in
better forecasts by mitigating uncertainty.
To sum up, the empirical literature provides support for the view that trans-
parency is beneficial in the sense that survey forecasts are more aligned with
each other and forecast errors decline. The evidence corroborates the general
view that enhancing transparency improves the predictability of central banks.
Theoretical papers reach more a nuanced conclusion. On the one hand, more
openness may reduce uncertainty about central banks’ intentions and their fu-
ture actions. On the other hand, by attempting to be as open as possible, they
may give the impression that they know more than they do. This is a critical
issue if transparency and communication serve as a coordination device among
economic agents, thereby generating the possibility that agents rely too much
on the utterances of central banks. This is what Morris & Shin (2002) argue can
happen. Svensson (2006) disagrees with some of their conclusions. Subsequent
3 Mankiw et al. (2003) show that a sticky-information model can generate a degree of disagree-
ment among agents.
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research could not settle the matter.4
Restricting transparency could be worth considering for other reasons. For in-
stance, the seminal paper by Cukierman & Meltzer (1986) argued that ambi-
guity enables monetary authorities to generate surprise inflation and stimulate
economic activity. King (2000) notes that a central bank should be highly trans-
parent about its monetary policy reaction function and its target. Beyond that, it
should avoid creating news itself. Too much transparency may be prone to mis-
interpretation and will translate into less-accurate predictions, as the amount of
information that can be digested effectively is limited (Kahneman (2003)).
3 Data
In this section, we describe the comprehensive data base we set up for the panel
regressions reported in the next section. We first describe the dependent, then
the independent variables. The observations are for a maximum of 73 countries
from 1998 to 2014, summing up to 17 years of 204 monthly observations per
country and forecast variable. The panel exhibits missing values (unbalanced
panel). For a full, detailed account of the variables, we refer to Appendix 1.
3.1 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are the absolute cross-sectional mean errors and the
cross-sectional standard deviations of forecasts made by professional forecasters
in predicting two financial variables, namely, short-term interest rates and yields
on 10-year government bonds, and two macroeconomic variables, namely, CPI
inflation and the growth rates of real GDP in four geographic regions: Asia-
Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and “Western countries” (North Amer-
ica, Western Europe, Israel, Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa). All
data are from Consensus Economics and are monthly (mostly).
Each month, the survey participants for a particular country report their fore-
casts of short-term rates for 3 and 12 months ahead. They also report their view
on the yields on their country’s 10-year government debt, also 3 and 12 months
ahead. Forecasts for CPI inflation and the growth rate of real GDP are also
4 In another paper (Lustenberger & Rossi (2017)), we test the model by Morris & Shin (2002) on
interest-rate and yield forecasts.
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reported on a monthly basis but refer to the end of the current year and the fol-
lowing year. Forecasts are provided by non-governmental entities (independent
or research institutes affiliated with universities) and economic consulting firms.
The majority are financial institutions, varying from domestic and regional com-
mercial banks to global investment banks.
We compare forecasts with realized short-term interest rates and long-term yields,
as well as end-of-year consumer price indices (where CPI was not available, we
chose the GDP deflator) and growth in real GDP. The data are from Reuters
EIKON, Bloomberg, IMF International Financial Statistics and the World Bank
data base.
3.2 Independent Variables
All independent variables are observed at a time when the forecasts are pub-
lished by Consensus Economics (on that day or the day before). We call this point
in time the ”forecast formation date”.
Speeches According to Freedman & Laxton (2009), the major mechanism for
how a central bank’s views can reach the public is through a Monetary Policy
Report or Inflation Report. Other communication means are press releases, re-
leases of minutes, and speeches to various audiences (among others). Freedman
& Laxton (2009) argue that ideally, all means of central bank communication
should complement each other to get their message across most effectively. Oth-
erwise, there is a risk of over-communicating and transmitting different mes-
sages through the various channels. However, in previous papers there is no
clear distinction between transparency and communication. We fill this gap.
We construct a new comprehensive and explicit measure of communication con-
sisting of central bank speeches. To this end, we compiled a variable made
up of central bank speeches as collected by the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS). For each central bank reporting their speeches to the BIS, we counted the
number given in the month preceding the forecast. For this variable, we have
observations from 1998 to 2014.
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Table 1: Central bank speeches by country from 1998 to 2014
WE (24) AP (15) EE (24) LA (10)
# Mean # Mean # Mean # Mean
USA 1386 6.79 AUS 280 1.37 CZE 35 0.17 ARG 31 0.15
JPN 453 2.22 CHN 93 0.46 HUN 11 0.05 BRA 10 0.05
DEU* 361 1.88 HKG 171 0.84 POL 20 0.10 CHL 73 0.36
FRA* 146 0.76 IND 648 3.18 RUS 3 0.01 MEX 40 0.20
GBR 373 1.83 IDN 36 0.18 TUR 83 0.41 VEN 0 0.00
ITA* 148 0.77 MYS 293 1.44 BGR 12 0.06 COL 5 0.02
CAN 344 1.69 NZL 110 0.54 HRV 4 0.02 PER 0 0.00
NLD* 88 0.46 PHL 204 1.00 EST** 19 0.09 URY 1 0.00
NOR 210 1.03 SGP 148 0.73 LVA** 8 0.04 SLV 0 0.00
ESP* 138 0.72 KOR 59 0.29 LTU** 0 0.00 GTM 1 0.00
SWE 410 2.01 TWN 0 0.00 ROU 24 0.12
CHE 281 1.38 THA 175 0.86 SVK** 3 0.01
AUT* 60 0.31 BGD 0 0.00 SVN** 2 0.01
BEL* 31 0.16 PAK 108 0.53 UKR 0 0.00
DNK 69 0.34 LKA 57 0.28 ALB 190 0.94
FIN* 80 0.42 ARM 1 0.00
GRC** 54 0.26 AZE 0 0.00
IRL* 126 0.66 BLR 0 0.00
PRT* 21 0.11 BIH 6 0.03
EGY 0 0.00 CYP** 3 0.01
ISR 75 0.37 GEO 0 0.00
NGA 29 0.14 KAZ 0 0.00
SAU 28 0.14 MKD 39 0.19
ZAF 233 1.14 MDA 0 0.00
ECB* 1386 7.22
LUX* 37 0.19
MLT** 19 0.23
The table shows the total number of speeches (#) and the average number of
speeches per month (mean) for a country. WE denotes Western countries, AP
Asia-Pacific countries, EE Eastern European countries, and LA Latin Ameri-
can countries. The number of countries in the set is given in parenthesis. The
euro was introduced in 1999. The ECB counts speeches given by its Execu-
tive Board members. In addition, we count all speeches given by members
of the Eurosystem from 1999 onwards, marked with *. Therefore, the total
number of speeches used in the variable Speech for AUT, BEL, FIN, FRA,
DEU, IRL, ITA, NLD, PRT and ESP is # 2712 (mean 14.26). Countries which
entered the Eurosystem after 1999 are marked with **. GRC entered in 2001
(# 2554 and mean 12.52), SVN in 2007 (# 1961 and mean 9.66), CYP in 2008
(# 1780 and mean 8.77), SVK in 2009 (1533 and mean 7.55), EST in 2011 (#
1086 and mean 5.35) and LVA since 2014 (# 287 and mean 1.41). LTU is not
member of the Eurosystem in our sample for it joined in 2015. No forecasts
for LUX and MLT (which entered the Eurosystem in 2008) are available. We
use LUX and MLT for completeness of the total number of speeches in the
Eurosystem.
10
Figure 1: Total speeches per year
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Figure 1 displays the number of speeches given by representatives of central banks per year in
the countries included in our sample.
We interpret a speech as a signal sent by the central bank. The theoretical foun-
dation for our interpretation is a Bayesian expectations model shown in Ap-
pendix 4 in which more signals are predicted to increase forecast accuracy and
reduce forecast dispersion.5
Table 1 exhibits the total number of speeches per country and their monthly av-
erage divided by four geographic areas. As can be seen, most speeches are given
by central banks in Western countries (WE), above all by the Federal Reserve
(1,386) and Japan (453). Indian central bankers, grouped with the Asia-Pacific
countries (AP), delivered the second-highest number of speeches (648).
Figure 1 illustrates how communication activities by central banks have inten-
sified over time. The number of speeches has steadily increased from approx-
imately 150 in 1998 to nearly 900 in 2013 and 2014. Importantly, this not only
reflects more communication activities but also a higher number of central banks
reporting their speeches to the BIS.
5 Note the content of a speech would allude to its precision. Its measure would require a content
analysis. A simpler approach about speeches’ precision could be its length. It might be that the
longer the speech, the more cryptical its information content. However, we refrain from both
in this paper and leave them for future research.
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There is no potential endogeneity problem associated with our communication
measure. Central bank speeches are announced months in advance. There-
fore, the number of speeches is fixed, making our communication proxy a well-
defined exogenous variable. While the number of speeches is fixed, the content
of a speech may take the economic situation into account. In a more uncertain
environment, forecasts are likely to be both more inaccurate and more disperse.
For this reason, the central bank may want to change the message of a speech.
We cannot exclude that some of the speeches were the result of unexpected
events that the central bank considered important enough to justify interven-
tion. However, for the bulk of the speeches, this is very unlikely.
Transparency We employ the most comprehensive measure of central bank
transparency in terms of country and time coverage based on an extension of
the multiple-dimensional transparency index of Eijffinger & Geraats (2006) pre-
sented by Dincer & Eichengreen (2014). Their index has annual observations
from 1998 to 2010 for 120 central banks.6 A score for each central bank between
zero (minimum transparency) and 15 (maximum transparency) can be obtained.
We measure transparency by the updated values of Dincer and Eichengreen,
which extends the observations reported in Dincer & Eichengreen (2014) by four
more years, until 2014. We utilize the composite index, its five sub-indices, and
its fifteen components.
Politico-Institutional Framework of Central Bank Independence We capture
the politico-institutional framework at central banks with two different measures
suggested by the credibility/transparency literature. The first is actual turnover
of the central bank’s governor in a year, as described by Dreher et al. (2010). The
second variable is central bank independence (CBI), proxied by the unweighted
independence index constructed by Dincer & Eichengreen (2014). It runs from
0 (lowest independence) to 1 (highest independence). Both measures include
annual observations starting in 1998. While the turnover index covers the full
range until 2014, the Dincer-Eichengreen index ends in 2010.
What does the turnover rate stand for in our setup? The literature on central
bank independence uses this variable as an indicator for central bank indepen-
dence, but on average over time. If a central bank has more governors in a given
6 As documented by Dincer & Eichengreen (2014), central banks in countries with higher per
capita income, deeper financial markets, more-open economies, and stronger political institu-
tions are more likely to be more transparent than others.
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period, it is presumably less independent. In our application, the interpreta-
tion is different. The variable is equal to one when the central bank governor
changes. Accordingly, uncertainty about future central bank behavior might eas-
ily be greater, leading to more inaccurate and dispersed forecasts. However, this
is an effect of uncertainty about the person and is unrelated to the independence
of the central bank. If anything, the personality of the governor should be more
important in an independent central bank. This implies that in such a central
bank, forecast dispersion is more likely than in a central bank where the gov-
ernor changes but is known to take instructions from the government.7 Hence,
we interpret CBI as a measure of independence and turnover as a measure of
(in)stability of central bank management.
Uncertainty Measures We use two uncertainty measures. The first is the VIX
(daily) and the second is the macroeconomic uncertainty measure (monthly) by
Jurado et al. (2015). The VIX is observed the day before forecasts are made while
the macoreconomic uncertainty measure is observed on the day when forecasts
are made. Broadly speaking, these variables may also account for the business
(interest rate) cycle, which is typically neglected in the related literature. Both
variables cover the period 1998 to 2014.
ZLB dummy We created a dummy variable for the period during which the
zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates was binding. We set the bind-
ing constraint at an interest rate level below 0.5%. It is only employed in the
regressions of interest rate and yield forecasts.
IT dummy We created a dummy that is equal to one if a central bank pursues
an inflation targeting policy, and zero otherwise.
FG dummy We also accounted for central banks pursuing a forward guidance
policy. We created a dummy that is equal to one during a period when forward
guidance was pursued, and zero otherwise.
Table 2 offers summary statistics for the variables of the benchmark regressions.
In the first set, we report the statistics for the absolute forecast errors of the four
dependent variables. The absolute cross-sectional mean forecast errors range
from zero to a maximum of 237 percent for CPI inflation forecasts. In the second
7 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
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set, we present the corresponding cross-sectional standard deviations, which
range from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 108. The third set yields the
details of the transparency index. It covers the whole (theoretical) range from
zero to 15. In addition to the overall values, we report the values for each of
the four geographic areas. The fourth set contains summaries of the other inde-
pendent variables. The number of speeches (our communication variable) has a
mean of 3.5 per month and a maximum of 50. For annual values of turnover of
central bank governors, the minimum is zero and the maximum reaches 3. The
VIX ranges from a minimum value of 10 to a maximum of 70, with an average
of 21. About 30% of our observations are in countries with inflation targeting
policies. Around 4% of observations coincide with forward guidance periods.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Interest Rate (abs FE) 1.093 2.536 0 67.293 11690
Yield (abs FE) 0.652 0.591 0 8.467 7158
CPI (abs FE) 1.656 4.915 0 236.979 24593
Real GDP (abs FE) 1.718 2.046 0 24.112 23459
Interest Rate (Std) 0.520 1.281 0 41.598 11806
Yield (Std) 0.379 0.660 0 15.909 7718
CPI (Std) 0.705 2.050 0 108.383 14906
Real GDP (Std) 0.523 0.410 0.026 8.653 14906
Central Bank Transparency
Overall 7.7 3.29 0 15 24593
Consensus Economics (WE) 9.4 2.97 1 15 9456
Asian-Pacific (AP) 6.7 3.27 0 14 5757
Eastern Europe (EE) 7.2 3.07 1 14.5 6376
Latin American (LA) 5.9 2.14 1 9 3004
Speech 3.51 7.37 0 50 24593
Turnover 0.16 0.37 0 3 24593
VIX 21.33 9.21 10.02 70.33 24593
ZLB 0.11 0.32 0 1 11686
Inflation Targeting 0.32 0.47 0 1 24593
Forward Guidance 0.04 0.20 0 1 24593
The table provides summary statistics for absolute cross-sectional
mean forecast errors (abs FE) and cross-sectional standard deviations
(Std) for the two financial (Interest Rates, Yields) and the two macroe-
conomic variables (CPI Inflation, and Real GDP Growth). The table
also exhibits the variation in central bank transparency in the four
subsets of geographic regions (Western, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe
and Latin American countries). Speech is the number of speeches
held by central banks per month. Turnover measures replacement of
central bank governors. VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange
Volatility Index. ZLB is a dummy for the zero lower bound. Infla-
tion Targeting is a dummy for inflation targeting policy and Forward
Guidance is a dummy for forward guidance as policy instrument.
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4 Results
This section is divided into nine subsections. In Subsection 4.1, we describe our
benchmark model and compare it with previous papers. In Subsection 4.2, we
elaborate on our benchmark regression results. Subsection 4.3 extends the anal-
ysis to the five different dimensions of the transparency index. Subsection 4.4
focuses on the results from the subcomponents making up the transparency
index. Subsection 4.5 examines the impact of the level of transparency. In Sub-
section 4.6, we analyze the influence of governor turnover and the degree of
central bank independence. Subsection 4.7 deals with the outcome from an
inflation targeting regime. Subsection 4.8 discusses the effects of forward guid-
ance, and in Subsection 4.9, we calculate the optimal degree of transparency for
money-market rate forecasts.
4.1 Benchmark Model
We begin with an explanation of our basic fixed-effects regression model. It is
given by
Yi,h,t = α + νi + βSP · Speechi,t + βTI · Transp.i,t + βTO · Turnoveri,t
+βVIX ·VIXt + βH · Hh + βT · Ty + βZLB · ZLBi,t + εi,h,t
i is the country, h is the forecast horizon, and t is a monthly time index.
Our left-hand side variable Yi,h,t is either the logarithm of the absolute cross-
sectional mean forecast error (log [|FEi,h,t|]) or the logarithm of the cross-sectional
standard deviation of forecasts (log [σi,h,t]) provided by Consensus Economics.
Our forecast variables are the three-month interest rates, ten-year government
bond yields, the percent change per annum of the CPI and the growth rate of
real GDP.8
On the right-hand side, α is the intercept, and νi the fixed effect for country i.
Speechi,t captures the number of speeches held by central bank representatives
of country i between t− 1 and t. Transp.i,t denotes central bank transparency.
Turnoveri,t stands for the number of central bank governor turnovers, and VIXt
represents the volatility index. Hh is a horizon fixed effect (dummy for the
8 Estimates for consumption growth and industrial production growth are available upon re-
quest.
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forecast horizon), Ty is a yearly fixed effect (dummy to capture a possible time
trend), and ZLBi,t is a dummy for the zero lower bound.
No potential endogeneity arises. All right-hand side variables are taken at the
point in time, when a forecast is formed (or the day before). For instance, for
the US CPI inflation forecast formed on June 11, 2012 for the end of year CPI
inflation, all right-hand side variables are measured on June 11, 2012 (or June
10, 2012). For the number of speeches in June 2012, we counted all speeches
held between May 15, 2012 (since the forecast day in the previous month was
May 14, 2012), and June 11, 2012. As we described in Subsection 3.2, speeches
are announced months in advance, making our communication proxy a well-
defined exogenous variable. The VIX is taken with its value on June 10, 2012
(the day before the forecast is formed). Hence, while higher uncertainty about
stock prices on June 10, 2012 makes forecasts formed on June 11 more uncertain,
a reverse effect is not possible. For this reason we do not treat survey dispersion
as a measure of uncertainty as is commonly done in the literature. Turnover and
transparency are also well-defined exogenous variables. It is highly unlikely that
a major change in the management of the central bank, a turnover, materializes
because of forecasters’ performance. For transparency, it is impossible that one
single even extreme forecast error realized in December 2012 motivates a central
bank to change its transparency and communication policy in June 2012 (before
the forecast error is observed).
Compared to previous research, we introduce three important new variables:
The number of speeches, the turnover of the central bank’s governor, and the
zero-lower-bound constraint. These three variables extend the empirical litera-
ture on central bank transparency along three dimensions. First, they allow us to
make a clear distinction between transparency and communication; second, to
take account of potential implications that uncertainty in a central bank’s man-
agement can have on forecasts; and third, to consider special constrains on mon-
etary policy which arose due to the financial crisis.9 Subsection 4.8 goes even
further and extends our benchmark model with a variable for forward guidance.
9 In addition, we employ the VIX instead of GARCH estimates as uncertainty measure.
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Figure 2: Plot of residuals on fitted values for country fixed-effects regression
models with forecast accuracy and dispersion measures of CPI Inflation
Residuals of regressions with absolute cross-sectional mean forecast error (left)
and log of absolute cross-sectional mean forecast error (right) as the dependent
variable (Yi,h,t)
Residuals with cross-sectional standard deviation (left) and log of
cross-sectional standard deviation (right) as dependent variable (Yi,h,t)
Residuals with inter-quartile range (left) and log of inter-quartile range (right)
as dependent variable (Yi,h,t)
Country fixed-effects regression model
Yi,h,t = α + νi + βTI · Transp.i,t + βVIX ·VIXt + βOIL · |∆Oilt|+βh · Hh + βT · Ty + +εi,h,t
For the sake of comparison with Ehrmann et al. (2012) and Naszodi et al. (2016), we add the
variation in the absolute value of the oil price to the list of regressors. α is the intercept and νi a
country fixed effect. Transp.i,t is the transparency index, ∆|Oilt| is the absolute oil price change,
Hh is a dummy for the forecast horizon, and Ty is a dummy for each year.
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A fundamental distinction from previous papers arises in the way we calculate
the dependent variables, visualized in Figure 2. The figure compares the resid-
uals of our model set-up, which are displayed on the right-hand side, with the
residuals we obtain from a regression model as typically used in the literature,
shown on the left-hand side. The dependent variable is CPI inflation. On the
right-hand side of the figure, we plot the residuals obtained from using the log-
arithm of the dependent variables. On the left-hand side, we show the residuals
without the log. We distinguish three measures of the dependent variables. The
first is either the absolute forecast error or its log. The results are at the top of
the figure. The second is either the cross-sectional standard deviation or its log,
with the results plotted in the middle of the figure. The third measure is either
the inter-quartile range or its log, shown at the bottom. In the literature follow-
ing Mankiw et al. (2003), the favorite measure of cross-sectional dispersion is the
inter-quartile range of forecasts. Arguably, the advantage of this measure over
the simple standard deviation is that it is insensitive to outliers, which might be
important in the analysis of survey data.
What Figure 2 clearly reveals is that the residuals follow a pattern when the
dependent variable is not taken in log (left-hand side). Besides heteroskedastic-
ity issues, there is a clear-cut lower bound to the value residuals assume in this
setting, as shown by the zoomed window at the top of the figure. Econometric
theory tells us that such a regression exhibits inconsistent variance estimates.
We solve these issues. First, we take logs of the dependent variables.10 As exhib-
ited by Figure 2 (right-hand side), taking the log of the absolute cross-sectional
mean forecast errors and the log of the cross-sectional standard deviation gener-
ates well-behaved residuals. Note that, as we observe at the bottom of Figure 2,
taking the log of the inter-quartile range does not eliminate the ”truncated” pat-
tern in the residuals. For this reason, we only use the log of cross-sectional
standard deviations of forecasts as a dispersion measure.
Second, we use panel clustered standard errors, where we cluster around coun-
tries. Variance estimates using panel clustered standard errors are consistent,
as shown by Stock & Watson (2008). The procedure has three advantages: it
allows us to get rid of inconsistent variance estimates, to take heteroskedasticity
10 We are grateful to Massimilano Marcellino for suggesting this data transformation.
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into account (only a minor issue)11, and to correct for correlation in the forecast
errors arising from overlapping forecast horizons.
4.2 Benchmark Regression Results
In this subsection, we discuss the results of the benchmark regressions. We pur-
sue a conservative approach and execute two-sided tests for significance of the
coefficients.12 The results are summarized in Table 3 for absolute forecast errors
and Table 4 for standard deviations.
The findings are sobering. Transparency does not improve the predictability of
financial and macroeconomic variables. It does improve the precision of yield
forecasts, but only in the subgroup of Western countries. More effective is the
influence of greater transparency on forecast dispersion by reducing the mis-
alignment among forecasters of money market rates, 10-year government bond
yields and, especially, inflation. Transparency has no effect on GDP growth fore-
casts.
The main and most important novel contribution to the literature relates to com-
munication, which, as discussed, is measured by the number of central bank
speeches. Three results arise. First, communication exerts a much greater influ-
ence on private forecast performance than transparency. Second, from Table 3
and Table 4, we can deduce that intensive communication activities make it more
difficult to forecast inflation, yields (the latter in contrast to what was found for
transparency) and GDP growth, and they increase the dispersion in forecasts of
inflation, yields and short-term rates. Third, in terms of statistical significance,
the effect of speeches on inflation forecasts is highest. We provide a discussion
and interpretation of these results in Section 6.
The further analysis sheds light on the effects of politico-institutional aspects
of central banks as measured by the turnover rate. The results suggest that
11 As Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) pointed out, heteroskedastic residuals coming from a log-
linearized model lead to biased estimates of the true model parameters. However, a visual
inspection of Figure 2 shows that at least the residuals under our log model for absolute
forecast errors do not exhibit heteroskedasticity. In the log model for cross-sectional standard
deviation, heteroskedasticity cannot be excluded by visual inspection, but seems to be rather
a minor issue.
12 A one-sided test would be appropriate if the estimated value departs from the reference value
in only one direction. However, as summarized above, in theory departures are possible in
both directions.
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instability in the management of central banks (turnover variable) reduces the
predictability of future interest rate actions of the central bank and makes the
inflation outlook more uncertain. Central bank instability has less of an impact
on forecast misalignments, with the exception of yield forecasts, which become
less homogeneous. GDP growth forecasts remain unaffected by the turnover
rate (similar to transparency).
The VIX plays an important role in most regressions of forecast dispersion. The
higher the market uncertainty is, the wider the dispersion becomes. By contrast,
market uncertainty has no impact on forecast errors, except for interest rate fore-
casts, which become more inaccurate.
Another result is that when the zero lower bound is reached, interest rates be-
come easier to predict and their dispersion decreases in Western countries and,
especially, in the Asia-Pacific area.
Finally, the fit of the regressions is higher for dispersion as a dependent vari-
able. For this type of regression, the best fit is found for inflation, particularly
in Western countries. The best fit for regressions of forecast errors is found for
interest rate forecasts in Latin America.
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Table 3: Absolute cross-sectional mean forecast errors
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.019 0.033 0.005** 0.005** -0.049 0.008
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
Transp. -0.033 -0.021 -0.125 0.158 -0.100 -0.076* -0.063*** -0.068 0.046
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.20) (0.19)
Turnover 0.203** -0.045 0.262** 0.637* 0.177 0.025 -0.122 0.233 0.211*
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.25) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08)
VIX 0.008*** 0.009** 0.003 0.009* 0.019* -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZLB -0.731*** -0.444** -1.169*** -0.814* 0.150 0.064 -0.085
(0.13) (0.17) (0.12) (0.37) (0.10) (0.09) (0.28)
N 11686 4761 3977 1407 1541 7155 4755 1604 796
Countries 34 12 12 5 5 23 12 7 4
R2 0.27 0.36 0.30 0.29 0.40 0.18 0.23 0.14 0.21
CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.020*** 0.017** 0.061*** 0.009 -0.041 0.010** 0.003 0.042 0.010 -0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06)
Transp. 0.006 0.017 -0.041 0.026 0.118** 0.042 -0.028 0.085 0.056 0.025
(0.03) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05)
Turnover 0.165** 0.027 0.103 0.028 0.347* 0.063 0.031 0.098 -0.014 0.032
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12)
VIX -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.005 -0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 24593 9456 5757 6376 3004 23497 9300 5676 5673 2848
Countries 73 24 15 24 10 73 24 15 24 10
R2 0.28 0.28 0.38 0.35 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.20
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The table shows results for a fixed-effects panel regression of the log of absolute
cross-sectional mean forecast errors. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast
horizons (3 and 12 months), while CPI Inflation and Real GDP Growth are fore-
casts for this year and next (24 different forecast horizons). We include a dummy
for each forecast horizon. Interest Rates and Yields have a dummy for the 12-
month forecast horizon; the other two variables have a dummy for each of the 23
forecast horizons. We also include a dummy for each year (the intercept, fixed
effects, and dummies are not shown in the table). All denotes all countries, WE
are the countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly Western countries),
AP are the countries in the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set, EE are the
Eastern European countries, and LA are the Latin-American Countries.
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Table 4: Cross-sectional standard deviation of forecasts
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.007** 0.003 0.024 -0.015 0.133 0.006** 0.006* -0.014 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Transp. -0.086** -0.009 -0.093* 0.079 -0.157 -0.099** -0.051 -0.130* -0.008
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
Turnover 0.126* 0.017 0.031 0.202 0.197* 0.080** 0.040 0.109** 0.012
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08)
VIX 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.005 0.010*** 0.014** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZLB -0.279* -0.333** -0.588*** 0.356 0.131* 0.073 0.261
(0.15) (0.13) (0.10) (0.36) (0.07) (0.07) (0.20)
N 11811 4756 4051 1457 1547 7714 4756 2158 800
Countries 34 12 12 5 5 23 12 7 4
R2 0.22 0.37 0.37 0.64 0.12 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.34
CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.010*** 0.004 0.024 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.011 -0.004 -0.071*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)
Transp. -0.112*** -0.007 -0.113 0.012 0.013 -0.020 -0.001 -0.064 0.013 0.001
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Turnover 0.109 -0.053 0.018 -0.010 0.351* 0.055 -0.032 0.034 0.072 0.081
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.16) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09)
VIX 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003 0.001 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 14942 4756 4266 3440 2480 14942 4756 4266 3440 2480
Countries 45 12 12 14 7 45 12 12 14 7
R2 0.46 0.66 0.60 0.63 0.35 0.47 0.58 0.57 0.48 0.46
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The table shows the results for a fixed-effects panel regression of the log of the forecasts’
cross-sectional standard deviation. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast horizons
(3 and 12 months), while CPI Inflation and Real GDP Growth are forecasts for this year
and next (24 different forecast horizons). We include a dummy for each forecast horizon.
Interest Rates and Yields have a dummy for the 12-month forecast horizon; the other two
variables have a dummy for each of the 23 forecast horizons. We also include a dummy
for each year (the intercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown in the table). All
denotes all countries, WE are the countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly
Western countries), AP are the countries in the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set,
EE are the Eastern European countries, and LA are the Latin-American Countries.
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4.3 Transparency subindices
Neuenkirch (2013) employs the overall transparency index by Eijffinger & Ger-
aats (2006) and the five subindices until 2009 for money market forecasts in 25
emerging market countries. The result is that all subindices improve market ex-
pectations, with political transparency having the largest effect.
We replace the overall transparency index by its five subindices as regressors:
TI1 Political Transparency, TI2 Economic Transparency, TI3 Procedural Trans-
parency, TI4 Policy Transparency, and TI5 Operational Transparency.13 The
fixed-effects model reads as follows
Yi,h,t = α + νi + βSP · Speechi,t + βTI1 · TI1i,t + · · · + βTI5 · TI5i,t
+βTO · Turnoveri,t + βVIX ·VIXt + βH · Hh + βT · Ty + βZLB · ZLBi,t + εi,h,t
Appendix 2.1, Table 7, summarizes. The results are heterogeneous. At odds
with Neuenkirch (2013), we find no evidence of an effect of any transparency
subindex. For single geographic areas, the evidence points to a varying impact
of the various transparency subindices dependent on the variable under exami-
nation.
4.4 Transparency subcomponents
As in Naszodi et al. (2016), we substitute the overall index by breaking it down
to its 15 subcomponents (questions).14 The regression equation looks like
Yi,h,t = α + νi + βSP · Speechi,t + βTI1a · TI1ai,t + · · · + βTI5c · TI5ci,t
+βTO · Turnoveri,t + βVIX ·VIXt + βH · Hh + βT · Ty + βZLB · ZLBi,t + εi,h,t
Appendix 2.2, Table 8, presents the results. Overall, no subcomponent provides
uniform and broadly based conclusions. Two results are worth highlighting,
however. First, question 3c – publication of voting records – results in less-
precise interest rate forecasts, especially in Western countries. Second, question
4a – decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target are
announced promptly – results in less-precise yield forecasts.
13 Details of the subindices can be found in Appendix 6.
14 Appendix 6 provides the details of the index construction.
24
4.5 Subsample lower and higher transparency (breakpoint 10)
Are there diminishing marginal returns from greater transparency? To answer
this question, we compare the results from central banks with a transparency
index level below 10 with those having an index value above 10. From the Ap-
pendix 2.3, Table 9, overall, we find no evidence of diminishing marginal returns
from greater transparency.
By contrast, the evidence on communication is more nuanced. More communi-
cation at a higher degree of transparency results in higher inaccuracy of yield
and, especially, inflation forecasts, echoing the results of the benchmark analysis.
However, under lower transparency levels (below 10), intensified communication
has hardly any effect on inflation forecasts anymore (expect for the Asian-Pacific
area). In fact, more communication even reduces the errors in yield forecasts,
the opposite of the benchmark result. In addition, region-specific outcomes re-
lated to money-market forecasts are noteworthy. For lower transparency levels,
money-market forecasts in the Asian-Pacific area would benefit from greater
transparency, whereas the precision of these forecasts would suffer from en-
hanced transparency in Western countries.
4.6 Turnover/CBI
The benchmark regressions, for which we have transparency values until 2014,
are based on the turnover rate as measure for instability within a central bank’s
management. We noted that a higher turnover rate gives rise to inaccurate in-
terest rate and inflation forecasts and contributes to less homogeneity in yield
forecasts.
Are the results affected by replacing the instability variable with a measure of
central bank independence (CBI)? To answer this question, we substitute the
turnover rate variable for the unweighted CBI index of Dincer & Eichengreen
(2014). The results for absolute cross-sectional mean forecast errors are listed in
Appendix 2.4, Table 10. We infer from the results that a greater CBI worsens
the quality of the forecasts of GDP growth and, limited to Western countries, the
yield forecasts. Overall, if anything, CBI negatively affects the quality of fore-
casts. Note that the negative effect of more communication on inflation and GDP
growth forecast accuracy found in the benchmark regression (with Turnover in-
stead of CBI) is still observable. We discuss this evidence in Section 6.
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4.7 Inflation targeting
A monetary policy strategy widely deemed to increase the transparency of
policy-making is inflation targeting (IT), and some attention has been devoted to
its impact on forecast performance. Cecchetti & Hakkio (2009) estimate how it
affects the dispersion of private sector forecasts of inflation. Using a panel data
set that includes 15 countries over 20 years, they find no convincing evidence
that IT reduces forecast dispersion. The results reported by Crowe (2010) for 11
countries suggest that IT improved the inflation forecasts for those whose initial
forecast accuracy was worst without harming the best forecasters.
We add to the evidence by assessing whether and how the introduction of IT
has had any repercussion on the quality and standard deviation of forecasts of
inflation, interest rates and yields. For this, we added a dummy for the presence
of IT to the regressors of the benchmark analysis (ITi,t). The regression equation
is
Yi,h,t = α + νi + βSP · Speechi,t + βTI · Transp.i,t + β IT · ITi,t
+βTO · Turnoveri,t + βVIX ·VIXt + βH · Hh + βT · Ty + βZLB · ZLBi,t + εi,h,t
As can be seen in Table 11, Appendix 2.5, IT tends, overall, to improve the pre-
cision of inflation forecasts and reduce the standard deviation of interest rate
forecasts. However, it has no effect on the cross-sectional standard deviation of
inflation and yield forecasts or any significant impact on the accuracy of inter-
est rate and yield forecasts. More importantly, the results of transparency and
speeches on forecast outcomes found in the benchmark regressions does not
change.
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4.8 Forward Guidance
In this subsection, we examine whether forward guidance has improved the
predictability of money-market rates and bond yields. For this purpose, we add
a dummy capturing forward guidance (FGi,t) to the list of benchmark regressors.
The fixed-effects regression model becomes
Yi,h,t = α + νi + βSP · Speechi,t + βTI · Transp.i,t + βFG · FGi,t
+βTO · Turnoveri,t + βVIX ·VIXt + βh · Hh + βT · Ty + βZLB · ZLBi,t + εi,h,t
As outlined in Table 12, Appendix 2.6, forward guidance hardly affected the
forecasts of the two financial variables in the whole sample of observations. For
Western countries, forward guidance does seem to have lowered the misalign-
ment of interest rate forecasts, but it increased the errors in forecasting yields
in Eastern Europe. As in the regressions on IT, the effect of transparency and
speeches on forecast outcomes reported in the benchmark regressions does not
change.
4.9 Optimal transparency
In Subsection 4.5, we noted the importance of the transparency level. In this
subsection, we want to go a step further. The results from the communication
discussed above suggest that it is public understanding of the significance of
released information that is central and not simply the quantity of information.
This raises the question of whether there is an optimum to the degree of trans-
parency. The empirical research on this topic has started recently. Ehrmann
& Fratzscher (2009) demonstrate that limiting the communication in the week
before Federal Open Market Committee meetings is a useful way to prevent
market volatility and speculation. Based on a panel data set with the trans-
parency measures provided by Dincer & Eichengreen (2010) from 1998 to 2005,
Van Der Cruijsen et al. (2010) find empirical support for an optimal intermedi-
ate degree of transparency at which inflation persistence is minimized. Ehrmann
et al. (2012) and Neuenkirch (2013) reach a similar verdict.
We contribute to this discussion by calculating the optimal level of transparency
for interest rate forecasts. For this purpose, we estimate a fixed-effects panel
regression with the absolute forecast errors as the endogenous variable. The re-
gressors are transparency, other controls and a dummy for the forecast horizon.
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As can be inferred from Figure 3, the relationship between transparency and
forecast errors seems to be quadratic. This is why we add transparency squared
to the list of regressors. Hence, the regression reads
log [|FEi,h,t|] = α + νi −0.479∗∗∗
(0.11)
·Transp.i,t + 0.027∗∗∗(0.01) · Transp.
2
i,t
+other controls + βH · Hh + βT · Ty + ei,h,t
”Other controls” include speech, turnover, the VIX, and the dummy for the zero
lower bound. Hh is a dummy for the forecast horizon, while Ty is a dummy for
each year. Panel clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. A Wald test for
the joint hypothesis that transparency and transparency squared are significant
leads to a p-value of 0.00 (F-Statistics 10.15 with F(2, 33) degrees of freedom).15
Figure 3: Absolute cross-sectional mean forecast errors and transparency for
interest rate forecasts
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Figure 3 illustrates the log of the absolute cross-sectional mean forecast error for interest rates
and transparency level.
The optimal transparency level for interest rate forecasts is 9.01, with a standard
deviation equal to 0.78.16 This gives rise to confidence intervals of 9.01± 1.96 ·
0.78 = [7.49; 10.54]. This result suggests that it is not optimal for a central bank
15 For yield, CPI inflation, and GDP growth we cannot reject the hypothesis that transparency
and transparency squared are jointly zero. In these cases, either a corner solution is optimal
or higher polynomials have to be considered in the analysis. This is beyond the scope of this
study.
16 For details of the theoretical derivation, see Appendix 5.
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to aspire to the highest transparency level of 15. Nor should its transparency
level lie below 7.5 in order to be predictable for money-market participants. For
central banks exhibiting a transparency level above 10.5, a cutback in their de-
gree of transparency may have beneficial effects in terms of the predictability of
money-market rates. According to the transparency levels reported in Table 2,
it is mainly Western Economies that have reached the threshold level (9.0). On
this account, the Latin American and Asian-Pacific countries – exhibiting mean
values around six – are likely to benefit from more transparency of their central
banks.
How do our results compare with other research? Neuenkirch (2013) studies
how transparency influences money market expectations in 25 emerging mar-
kets for the period 1998 to 2009. He reports that an intermediate level of trans-
parency has the most favorable influence on money market expectations. Levels
below 7.5 have a negative effect, while levels above seem to be beneficial. During
the period 2004-2009, an index of 8 is found to be optimal.
Compared with Van Der Cruijsen et al. (2010), who report an optimum level of 6,
our optimality level is clearly higher. Van Der Cruijsen et al. (2010) believe that
the actual optimal degree of transparency might be higher, because low degrees
of transparency were observed more often. The average degree of transparency
in their sample was 4 (compared with 7.7 in our sample), while the maximum
was 13.5 (compared with 15 in our sample). In a regression with only OECD
countries, they derived an optimal degree of 7.5.
Note that Van Der Cruijsen et al. (2010) calculated optimality levels for infla-
tion forecasts, whereas our estimates relate to optimal transparency for inter-
est rate forecasts. For interest rate forecasts, we reject the joint hypothesis of
transparency and transparency squared being zero. For all other variables, the
joint hypothesis of transparency and transparency squared being zero is not
rejected. This suggests that for interest rate forecasts, transparency has an op-
timum, whereas for the other variables, no optimal transparency level can be
derived from the underlying quadratic function.
While it may be pointless to argue about the precise level of transparency that en-
ables private agents to best predict central bank actions in the future, a compar-
ison of our results with those reported by Van Der Cruijsen et al. (2010) may be
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instructive, as they seem to indicate that the optimality level may have increased
over the last decade or so. However, we fully agree with Van Der Cruijsen
et al. (2010) that the optimum is likely to be central bank-specific and, perhaps,
region-specific, given the different information-processing capacities and his-
torical, traditional and cultural backgrounds. The regression analysis reported
above does indeed point to distinguished area- (and variable-) specific effects of
transparency and communication on private-sector forecasts.
5 Robustness
We redid the estimations with a variety of alternative regressors. In sum, the
benchmark results remained valid. We performed the following robustness
checks.
Exclusion of the time dummy Excluding the yearly dummy in the benchmark
regression leads qualitatively to similar results, but the number of significant
coefficients increases dramatically, similar to Naszodi et al. (2016).17
Distinction between forecast horizons In Appendix 3.1, Table 13 and Ta-
ble 14, we report the results for the financial variables distinguished by the
two forecast horizons. As can be inferred from Table 13, the basic message that
transparency in general does not affect the forecast errors is confirmed. Unlike
Middeldorp (2011), we find no difference in transparency’s effect on predictabil-
ity between the 3-month and 12-month forecast horizons.18 The error-increasing
effect of communication seems to derive from the 3-month forecast horizon,
whereas the error-reducing effect of greater transparency in Western countries
appears to stem from the 12-month horizon. As can be seen in Table 14, the
results for dispersion are similar in both forecast horizons, suggesting that the
length of the forecasting horizon is irrelevant for the alignment of forecasts of
the two financial variables.
Crisis dummy and subsample analysis We constructed a dummy for the fi-
nancial crisis, which started in August 2007. The results for both accuracy and
dispersion were identical to those of the benchmark model. In addition, we redo
17 Results are available upon request.
18 To match the Dincer-Eichengreen data, Middeldorp (2011) utilizes only the survey results for
the month closest to the middle of the year, while we use all observations.
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our benchmark regressions but limit the observations to the period before the
financial crisis (Dec 2006). In general, the results do not change, but are slightly
less significant.19
Excluding euro area countries So far, we have used all forecasts from the euro
area countries. Consensus Economics does not collect forecasts for the euro area
as a whole, but it does for several constituent countries. To eliminate a poten-
tial overweight of the ECB – for instance, we have 17 euro area countries in the
calculation of absolute CPI forecast errors – we excluded all euro area countries
except for Germany20 and redid the regression for forecast errors and cross-
section standard deviations.
As outlined in Appendix 3.2, Table 15 and Table 16, the benchmark results
are confirmed. The only change compared with the benchmark is that trans-
parency has a weaker (alignment-enhancing) impact on the standard deviations
of money-market rate and yield forecasts.
Revised GDP figures We found that GDP forecasts react only little to trans-
parency and communication. However, as is well known, GDP figures are regu-
larly revised. To take account of this fact, we used the December GDP forecasts
for the current year as the nearest value to the effectively realized GDP and
reran the benchmark regression for absolute forecast errors. Overall, the main
message concerning communication and transparency remained unchanged.21
Uncertainty measure by Jurado et al. (2015) We also checked whether the re-
sults remain unaltered if we replaced the VIX with the uncertainty measures
from Jurado et al. (2015).
As presented in Appendix 3.3, Table 17 and Table 18, the evidence obtained
in the benchmark analysis remains unchanged. Transparency has no effect on
forecast precision, but it does reduce forecast dispersion. By contrast, communi-
cation worsens the quality of forecasts and increases their dispersion.
19 Results are available upon request.
20 For instance, Middeldorp (2011) only used observations from Germany in his analysis.
21 Only in the Asian Pacific region did the effect of communication change slightly with respect
to the benchmark regression. The coefficient remained positive, but became weakly significant.
Results are available upon request.
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The effect of uncertainty itself on forecast errors is, contrary to the VIX utilized
in the benchmark, significant for inflation forecasts. Contrary to the VIX, this
uncertainty measure turns out to exert an insignificant effect on the standard de-
viation of inflation and GDP growth forecasts, for which the VIX yielded highly
significant results.22
Other institutional variables We also regressed on a series of indicators of
good governance and freedom (which exhibit the lowest collinearity issues). Ap-
pendix 3.4, Table 19, shows the correlation of these indicators with central bank
transparency. The benchmark results are also robust to this extension.23
Only months with speeches In the benchmark regressions we included obser-
vations in the months when actually no speech was delivered. As robustness
check, we eliminated these observations from the sample. The general message
did not alter.24
Exclusion of outliers Finally, we excluded the countries with the largest out-
liers in terms of forecast errors and took account of the number of forecasters.
The results did not change.25
6 Policy implications
How do we read the results found in this paper in terms of policy implications?
When it comes to transparency, the policy implications are not clear-cut. If the
policy objective is to get forecasters to provide more-precise forecasts, our results
suggest that transparency is not an adequate tool to achieve it. However, if the
objective is to align individual forecasts, then the general normative implication
seems to be an increase in transparency.
22 We also replaced the VIX with the 30-day return volatility of country MSCI stock market
indices. Results did not change. They are available upon request.
23 Results are available upon request.
24 The coefficient of speech in the benchmark regression with absolute cross-sectional mean fore-
cast errors as the dependent variable turned negative for interest rate forecasts, but was largely
insignificant. Results are available upon request.
25 For CPI inflation forecasts, the largest absolute forecast errors (> 25%-points) are in ARG,
BGR, BLR, MDA, RUS, TUR, UKR, and VEN. For interest rate forecasts, the outliers are ARG,
IDN, and VEN. Results are available upon request.
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One way to interpret the evidence relating to communication is that in order to
improve the quality of forecasts of variables that are central to monetary policy-
making and align them among professional forecasters, central banks ought to
speak less often, especially those that have already achieved a certain degree of
transparency.
In general, this normative conclusion can be derived in a Bayesian expectations
framework. As we show in Appendix 4, in such a model, our empirical results
suggest that more-frequent communication increases the uncertainty of recip-
ients of central bank signals and/or suggests that central banks communicate
less precisely.
The important question, then, is whether less-precise communication is an un-
intended effect of too much talk or whether it is a deliberate choice. The latter
is not unrealistic. Indeed, it is probably not always optimal to reduce disagree-
ment across forecasters. There might be circumstances when forecasters under-
estimate uncertainty, and the central bank may deem it appropriate to remedy
this and raise disagreement among forecasters. A case in point is particularly
uncertain times, when the central bank may want to convey to the markets an
increased uncertainty underlying its own forecasts or to dampen market partic-
ipants’ risk-taking behavior.
However, the second explanation is more realistic, for it is difficult to imagine
that a central bank deliberately chooses to keep raising the uncertainty in the
markets over time. The reason, as noted by Blinder (2007), is that the policy-
effectiveness argument for central bank transparency boils down to teaching the
markets to “think like the central bank”. Doing so will enable the central bank
to manage expectations of future monetary policy better and, in particular, to
keep them in line with its own thinking.
In this context, the way central banks reach their decisions is crucial. Blinder
(2004) argues that the transformation of monetary policy decisions from indi-
vidual decisions to group decisions constitutes one of the most notable devel-
opments in the recent evolution of central banking. Group decision making is
likely to achieve better macroeconomic outcomes than individual decision mak-
ing for a variety of reasons. First, group decision making provides some insur-
ance against the possibly extreme preferences of an individual. Second, pooling
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knowledge in an uncertain world should lead to better analysis and forecasts
– and, therefore, to better decisions. Third, a group of people who process in-
formation and reach decisions differently may outperform even highly skilled
individuals when it comes to the execution of complex tasks. Blinder & Mor-
gan (2005) confirm in an experimental laboratory environment that groups out-
perform individuals in making monetary policy. However, committee decision
making also has its downsides. Sibert (2006) points to the danger of group-think
and the tendency of members of a group to free-ride on the efforts of others.
Thus, not every group decision is necessarily better than a decision taken by an
individual.
According to Blinder (2004), there is no one “right way” to communicate. The
most-appropriate forms of central bank communication with the public, the gov-
ernment, and the markets depend on the nature of the monetary policy commit-
tee. Blinder (2004) distinguishes individualistic committees and collegial com-
mittees. An individualistic committee reaches decisions by true majority vote.
Collegial committees come in two forms. Genuinely collegial committees strive
for consensus. In an autocratically collegial committee, the chairman comes close
to dictating the committee’s decision. One potential disadvantage that is partic-
ularly relevant for an individualistic committee is that it may confuse outside
observers by speaking with too many voices. When too many voices confuse
rather than enlighten the markets and the public, transparency turns into noise
and degenerate into what Blinder (2004) called cacophony. By contrast, mem-
bers of a collegial committee agree in advance that their individual differences
of opinion must be subordinated to the common good. A collegial committee
should be able to speak with one voice most of the time. There should be no
(or negligible) public disagreements. Blinder (2007) prefers a monetary policy
committee to a single individual, more precisely an individualistic committee
structure rather than a collegial one. Members of an individualistic committee
have individual accountability, not just group accountability. Acquiring some
understanding of the group dynamics should improve market participants’ abil-
ities to forecast the committee’s future decisions. Moreover, according to Blinder
(2007) individualistic committees seem to have coped with their potential ca-
cophony problem.
Or have they? Our dataset does not allow us to differentiate between the dif-
ferent potential types of monetary policy committees along the lines proposed
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by Blinder (2004). However, the empirical evidence in this paper suggests that
the number of speeches has created confusion rather than clarity. This points
to the possibility of (individualistically structured) central banks talking at cross
purposes. To corroborate this conjecture, the results obtained from the variables
relating to central bank (in)stability and independence may help. As discussed,
both a higher turnover rate and a higher CBI index point qualitatively in the
same direction. Both suggest a negative effect on the quality of forecasts, al-
though they measure two distinct dimensions of the politico-institutional frame-
work of central banks, mirrored in a correlation coefficient of -0.0026. The evi-
dence seems reasonable for the turnover variable: the more stable the manage-
ment of the central bank is, the easier it is for market participants to anticipate
future policy decisions.
More difficult is rationalizing the evidence associated with the CBI variable. Af-
ter all, the central bank independence/credibility literature points to increased
credibility arising from greater independence with potential favorable knock-on
effects on the variance and predictability of variables. However, our CBI variable
covers several dimensions of a central bank’s structure. One possible dimension
is consistent with the observation made by Blinder (2004) that central bank in-
dependence promotes the switch to committee decisions rather than individual
decisions. This switch may have raised the risk that the central bank speaks with
a cacophony of voices.
As an additional corroborating factor for this argumentation, we constructed a
variable called committee size that captures the size of monetary policy commit-
tees.26 The correlation of committee size with the number of speeches is +0.74.
This suggests that the number of speeches increases in committees’ size. More-
over, the correlation of committee size with the CBI variable is +0.51. This is in
line with Blinder (2004), who notes that in a number of countries, the movement
toward committees went hand-in-glove with the spread of central bank indepen-
dence. Hence, although causality may run in both directions, these correlations
may suggest that the more independent central banks are, the larger the size of
the monetary policy committees, and the larger the monetary policy committees
are, the more speeches they deliver. This may be one explanation for the rise
in the number of speeches over the years that underlie the rise of potential ca-
cophony. We can also give the following interpretation to the evidence of the
26 See Appendix 1.2.
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turnover rate variable: a lower turnover, which reflects a longer effective tenure,
could mirror the dominance of an autocratically collegial committee, for which
the cacophony problem is less of an issue.
To sum up, we find that the more speeches central banks give, the greater the
confusion this creates among forecasters. Whether this arises from too many
voices about monetary policy issues or from too many topics not directly related
to monetary policy decisions, such as climate change, education, or inequality,
is an important avenue for future research.
7 Conclusions
By increasing market participants’ ability to predict future policy actions, trans-
parency is expected to increase monetary policy effectiveness. Anticipation of
the central bank’s actions results in a smoother operation in the first steps of
the transmission mechanism between policy actions and economic activity and
inflation. The question therefore is: Does central bank communication and trans-
parency affect macroeconomic forecasts at all and in the intended way? We an-
swer this question based on a large sample of countries for financial and macro-
economic variables important for monetary policymaking provided by the pri-
vate sector.
To answer this question, we adjust the estimation procedure compared with
previous studies. We argue that the absolute forecast errors and their standard
deviations should be measured in log in order to avoid inconsistent variance
estimates.
The answer is only partially affirmative and particularly it is shown that a clear
distinction between central bank communication and transparency should be
made. Our main finding is that more speeches worsen the accuracy and preci-
sion of financial and macroeconomic forecasts. This insight had been anticipated
by Simon (1971), for whom “(...) a wealth of information creates a poverty of at-
tention (...).” It also lines up with the conclusions drawn by, for instance, Morris
& Shin (2002), Sims (2003), Kahneman (2003) and Blinder (2004), for whom un-
coordinated communication might actually lower, rather than raise, the signal-
to-noise ratio and, in turn, hamper the operation of monetary policy. Stated
differently, a “central bank that speaks with a cacophony of voices may, in effect,
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have no voice at all” (Blinder 2004, p. 57). Thus, speaking less may be beneficial
for central banks that want to raise predictability and homogeneity among fi-
nancial and macroeconomic forecasts. We provide some evidence that this may
be particularly true for central banks whose transparency level is already high.
Our results also show that we should not expect too much from greater trans-
parency either. We provide compelling evidence that, in general, central bank
transparency is not an effective instrument to improve the accuracy of private
forecasts. At a more detailed level, our results suggest that it does not constitute
a one-size-fits-all model but has effects that vary significantly across countries
and variables. Some dimensions, such as the publication of voting records, are
even detrimental to the quality of interest rate forecasts.
A forward-guidance policy as pursued after the financial crisis has not borne
fruit. It did not affect either the errors or the dispersion of yield forecasts and
had only a weak effect on interest rate dispersion. The zero lower bound con-
straint does notably not affect yield forecasts. Not surprisingly it tends to reduce
the forecast errors of interest rates and forecast dispersion.
Overall, the empirical evidence supports the view expressed by Cukierman
(2009), who probes the limits of transparency in general. He argues that given
the high degree of opacity in the past, it is highly likely that the move of cen-
tral banks over the last 20 years towards openness to the public has improved
matters. However, he also reminds us that since sufficiently high transparency
is now in place and is part of the orthodoxy, the time has come to take a more
realistic look at the limits of its feasibility and desirability. That said, we also
provide evidence that more transparency contributes to aligning single forecasts
with each other. From this perspective, transparency seems to provide the an-
chor by which agents’ forecasting actions are coordinated. Thus, what seems to
be important in the discussion about more or less central bank transparency is to
make a clear distinction between its impact on forecast accuracy and its impact
on forecast dispersion.
In a more general context, our results make a contribution to the theoretical lit-
erature on the social value of information. The general message arising from our
empirical analysis is that more public information may make it more difficult for
agents to deduce its content.
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We also make a contribution in highlighting the importance of the stability and
independence of central banks to the quality of private-sector forecasts. Our
finding on this account is that a higher turnover of governors tends to reduce
the precision of interest rate and inflation forecasts. Greater central bank in-
dependence also tends to worsen the quality of forecasts, perhaps by increas-
ing the size of monetary policy committees that may lead to cacophony. More
importantly, the implications of transparency and communication for forecast
precision remain broadly unaffected by the choice of an (in)stability proxy or a
central bank independence proxy in the regressions.
Future research could track the evolution of committee sizes and analyze the
effects per speaker. Another extension could examine the content of speeches
along various dimensions, such as their length, comprehensibility and keywords.
This would allow to tackle the question whether cacophony arises from too
many speeches about all sorts of issues not directly related to monetary pol-
icy or from a variety of voices on monetary policy issues.
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Appendix 1 Data sources and construction
Table 5 lists the countries in our sample and their regional classifications as
adopted by Consensus Economics and the country codes.
Table 5: Consensus Economics data sets and countrycodes
Consensus Forecasts (WE) Asia Pacific Eastern Europe Latin American
Consensus Forecasts (AP) Consensus Forecasts (EE) Consensus Forecasts (LA)
USA United States of America AUS Australia CZE Czech Republic ARG Argentina
JPN Japan CHN China HUN Hungary BRA Brazil
DEU Germany HKG Hong Kong POL Poland CHL Chile
FRA France IND India RUS Russia MEX Mexico
GBR United Kingdom IDN Indonesia TUR Turkey VEN Venezuela
ITA Italy MYS Malaysia BGR Bulgaria COL Colombia
CAN Canada NZL New Zealand HRV Croatia PER Peru
NLD Netherlands PHL Philippines EST Estonia URY Uruguay
NOR Norway SGP Singapore LVA Latvia SLV El Salvador
ESP Spain KOR South Korea LTU Lithuania GTM Guatemala
SWE Sweden TWN Taiwan ROU Romania
CHE Switzerland THA Thailand SVK Slovakia
AUT Austria BGD Bangladesh SVN Slovenia
BEL Belgium PAK Pakistan UKR Ukraine
DNK Denmark LKA Sri Lanka ALB Albania
FIN Finland ARM Armenia
GRC Greece AZE Azerbaijan
IRL Ireland BLR Belarus
PRT Portugal BIH Bosnia & Herzegovina
EGY Egypt CYP Cyprus
ISR Israel GEO Georgia
NGA Nigeria KAZ Kazakhstan
SAU Saudi Arabia MKD Macedonia
ZAF South Africa MDA Moldova
Appendix 1.1 Dependent variables
Consensus Economics collects monthly financial variables: short-term Interest
Rates and long-term Yields three and twelve months into the future. In addi-
tion, the survey includes forecasts of macroeconomic forecasts: CPI Inflation
and Real GDP Growth for the current and next year. We collected the absolute
cross-sectional mean forecast and the cross-sectional standard deviations of fore-
casts for the four variables from 1998 to 2014 on a monthly basis.
As shown in Table 5, Consensus Economics groups countries into four sets: Con-
sensus Forecasts (WE, mostly Western countries), Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts
(AP), Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (EE), and Latin American Consensus Fore-
casts (LA). Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts was collected by Consensus Eco-
nomics every second month until May 2007 and monthly from then on. Latin
American Consensus Forecasts has been collected at a monthly frequency since
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April 2001. Before then, Consensus Economics had collected the forecasts for
Latin American countries every second month. The four data sets thus have
different publication dates and, consequently, different forecast formation dates.
Consensus Forecasts and Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts are usually published at
the beginning of the month. Latin American Consensus Forecasts and Eastern Eu-
rope Consensus Forecasts follow after some days.
For interest rates and yields, Consensus Economics collects forecasts with a 3- and
12-month horizon, leading to two forecasts per month and variable. For each
month, there are two standard deviations and mean forecasts per macroeco-
nomic variable: one forecast for the end of the current year and the other fore-
cast for the end of the following year. From 1998 to 2014, there are 204 months.
The maximum number of observations possible for cross-sectional standard de-
viations and mean forecasts is therefore 408.
Absolute mean forecast errors have been calculated by using the realized val-
ues from various data sources. Realized Interest Rates and Yields are from
Reuters EIKON (with one exception from Bloomberg). We paid attention to changes
in interest rates that are forecast. Tickers are available upon request. The World
Bank supplies realized CPI Inflation [Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)].27
Realized Real GDP Growth is from IMF International Financial Statistics, called
[real GDP growth (annual %)] in their data base.28 Table 6 summarizes the
observations per country and variable.
Cross-sectional standard deviations of forecasts are calculated by Consensus
Economics. Table 6 summarizes the available observations per country and vari-
able.
27 For BIH, we use [Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)] from the World Bank data base, since
[Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)] for BIH is not available. For TWN, we use [Taiwan,
CPI Inflation, Price Index] from Reuters EIKON, ticker aTWCPI.
28 For five countries – TWN, ARM, AZE, BIH, and MDA – real GDP was not available in the IMF
data base. We therefore used the following tickers from Reuters EIKON: aTWGDP/C [Taiwan,
GDP, Constant Prices], aAMGDPC/C [Armenia, GDP, Constant Prices], aAZGDPC/C [Azer-
baijan, GDP, Constant Prices], aBACGDPD/CA [Bosnia and Herzegovina, GDP, Standardized,
Constant Prices, SA], aMDCGDPD/CA [Moldova, GDP, Standardized (based on source annual
data), Constant Prices, SA] and calculated the corresponding growth rate.
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Table 6: Number of observations per coun-
try and variable
CPI GDP Interest Yields
Inflation Growth Rates
FE Std FE Std FE Std FE Std
ConsensusForecastsDataSet
USA 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408
JPN 408 408 408 408 406 408 408 408
DEU 384 384 384 384 384 384 383 384
FRA 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384
GBR 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408
ITA 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384
CAN 408 408 408 408 407 408 408 408
NLD 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384
NOR 408 398 408 398 397 398 398 398
ESP 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384
SWE 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408
CHE 408 398 408 398 407 398 398 398
AUT 384 0 384 0 0 0 0 0
BEL 384 0 384 0 0 0 0 0
DNK 408 0 408 0 0 0 0 0
FIN 384 0 384 0 0 0 0 0
GRC 336 0 336 0 0 0 0 0
IRL 384 0 384 0 0 0 0 0
PRT 384 0 384 0 0 0 0 0
EGY 408 0 408 0 0 0 0 0
ISR 408 0 408 0 0 0 0 0
NGA 384 0 228 0 0 0 0 0
SAU 408 0 408 0 0 0 0 0
ZAF 408 0 408 0 0 0 0 0
Total 9456 4756 9300 4756 4761 4756 4755 4756
AsiaPacificConsensusForecastsDataSet
AUS 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408
CHN 408 408 348 408 260 258 0 0
HKG 408 408 408 408 408 408 0 0
IND 408 408 408 408 381 408 233 408
IDN 408 408 408 408 384 407 227 408
MYS 408 408 408 408 408 408 0 0
NZL 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408
PHL 405 138 408 138 78 77 0 0
SGP 408 408 396 408 384 408 0 0
KOR 408 408 408 408 408 408 74 74
TWN 48 48 48 48 45 45 29 48
THA 408 408 408 408 405 408 225 404
BGD 408 0 408 0 0 0 0 0
PAK 408 0 408 0 0 0 0 0
LKA 408 0 396 0 0 0 0 0
Total 5757 4266 5676 4266 3977 4051 1604 2158
Continued on next page
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Table 6 – continued from previous page
CPI GDP Interest Yields
Inflation Growth Rates
FE Std FE Std FE Std FE Std
EasternEuropeConsensusForecastsDataSet
CZE 296 292 296 292 292 292 200 200
HUN 296 292 296 292 292 292 200 200
POL 296 292 284 292 292 292 200 200
RUS 296 292 284 292 0 0 0 0
TUR 296 292 296 292 240 289 0 0
BGR 296 184 296 184 0 0 0 0
HRV 292 184 292 184 0 0 0 0
EST 292 184 292 184 0 0 0 0
LVA 292 184 292 184 0 0 0 0
LTU 292 184 292 184 0 0 0 0
ROU 296 292 296 292 0 0 0 0
SVK 296 292 296 292 291 292 196 200
SVN 296 184 296 184 0 0 0 0
UKR 296 292 218 292 0 0 0 0
ALB 184 0 112 0 0 0 0 0
ARM 184 0 36 0 0 0 0 0
AZE 292 0 60 0 0 0 0 0
BLR 292 0 292 0 0 0 0 0
BIH 184 0 156 0 0 0 0 0
CYP 218 0 218 0 0 0 0 0
GEO 184 0 184 0 0 0 0 0
KAZ 280 0 159 0 0 0 0 0
MKD 184 0 184 0 0 0 0 0
MDA 246 0 246 0 0 0 0 0
Total 6376 3440 5673 3440 1407 1457 796 800
LatinAmericanConsensusForecastsDataSet
ARG 332 368 368 368 330 330 0 0
BRA 368 368 284 368 324 328 0 0
CHL 368 368 368 368 323 325 0 0
MEX 368 368 368 368 330 330 0 0
VEN 272 272 272 272 234 234 0 0
COL 368 368 260 368 0 0 0 0
PER 368 368 368 368 0 0 0 0
URY 272 0 272 0 0 0 0 0
SLV 144 0 144 0 0 0 0 0
GTM 144 0 144 0 0 0 0 0
Total 3004 2480 2848 2480 1541 1547 0 0
Overall 24593 14942 23497 14942 11686 11811 7155 7714
FE stands for the available number of absolute cross-sectional mean
forecast errors while Std is the number of available forecasts’
cross-sectional standard deviations.
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Appendix 1.2 Independent variables
All independent variables are observed at a time when the forecasts are pub-
lished by Consensus Economics. We call this point in time the ”forecast formation
date”.
Speech is the number of speeches held by representatives of a central bank
shown in Table 1. We extracted these monthly numbers from the “central
bankers’ speeches” database of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Cen-
tral banks can report speeches they held in English to the BIS. The number of
countries reporting to the BIS has increased over time. 29 For each month, we
counted all speeches held in the previous month, paying attention to the dates
when forecasts were formed. For instance, for WE countries, we counted all
speeches between January 12, 1998, and February 9, 1998, for speeches in Febru-
ary 1998. For the beginning of the LA country sample, forecasts are published
only every second month. Therefore, we summed all speeches between these
forecast dates. For instance, for April 1998, we counted all speeches between
February 16, 1998, and April 20, 1998.
The database of the BIS is (probably) not complete and contains only speeches
in English. However, it is fair to assume that the most important speeches are
included. The central banks for which there is no speech in the BIS database
over the whole time span have an entry of zero.
Speeches from the euro area include all speeches of ECB Board members and
Presidents of Eurosystem member central banks. In other words, we counted
DEU, FRA, ITA, NLD, ESP, AUT, BEL, FIN, IRL and PRT as speeches from the
euro area starting in 1999 (start of sample for these countries). In addition, we
added to the observations of the euro area the values for GRC from 2001, SVN
from 2007, CYP from 2008, SVK from 2009, EST from 2011, and LVA from 2014
on.
29 The speeches are available under http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/. We thank Bettina
Eberhard (BIS), Paul Moser-Boehm (BIS) and Simon De´praz for their help in collecting these
data.
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Transp. is the updated version of the transparency index by Dincer & Eichen-
green (2014).30 It runs from 0 to 15 for annual observations from 1998 to 2014.
We set the value of the index in June of each year. Then, we interpolated these
values over the remaining months. In addition, we enlarged the sample slightly.
First, we asked the central bank of TWN for their transparency level, since it is
not available in the Dincer-Eichengreen index. TWN assigned itself a level of 11
for both 2013 and 2014. Second, we used the ECB index value for AUT, BEL,
DEU, FIN, FRA, IRE, ITA, NLD, PRT and ESP since 1999 (coinciding with the
sample start for these countries). We also used the ECB value for countries that
entered the euro area. This is the case for GRC since 2001 (Dincer & Eichengreen
(2014) do not report an index value for GRC before 2001) and for SVK and SVN
since 2007. SVK entered the euro area in 2009. Since the transparency index for
SVK stops in 2006, we apply the ECB values for 2007 onwards. We use the ECB
index values for CYP from 2008 on and for EST and LVA from 2011. Note that
LVA entered the euro area in 2014, but entries for the transparency index stop in
2011. Hence, we use the ECB values from 2011 onwards.
The subindices and the detailed questions underlying the construction of the
index are available from 1998 to 2010.31 We proceeded the same way as described
above – June is the index value, while for the other months we interpolated. No
subindex is available for TWN. For the details of the index construction, we refer
to Appendix 6.
Turnover is the annual turnover rate of central bank governors described by
Dreher et al. (2010).32 We adjusted the data as follows. If there was a turnover,
we assigned 1 to all months of the year. If there were two turnovers, all months
of this particular year were assigned 2, and so forth. We also enlarged the data
sample slightly with values for TWN, MDA, and AZE. For TWN, there is only
one change in February 1998.33 For MDA, there is one change in 2009.34 For
AZE, no change is recorded since 1994.35 In addition, values for UKR in 1998
30 We downloaded the updated index from http://eml.berkeley.edu/%7Eeichengr/
Dincer-Eichengreen_figures&tables_2014_9-4-15.pdf in February 2017.
31 The subindices and detailed questions are available under http://eml.berkeley.edu/
~eichengr/TI_dincer_eichengreen_2010-1.xlsx, downloaded in February 2017.
32 We downloaded these data in February 2017 using the link https://www.kof.ethz.ch/
services/daten/data-on-central-bank-governors.html.
33 Source: http://www.cbc.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=26314&ctNode=455&mp=2, March 2017.
34 Source: http://www.bnm.org/en/content/history-nbm, March 2017.
35 Source: https://en.cbar.az/pages/about-us/organizational-structure/
management-board/, March 2017.
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and 1999 are missing. However, there was no turnover in 1998 and 1999.36 We
also corrected the data set by Dreher et al. (2010). CAN has an error in 2014.
We set the two changes reported by Dreher et al. (2010) to zero since, in fact, no
turnover occurred.37 For members of the euro area, we used the turnover of the
president of the ECB. For the countries that entered the euro area after 1999, we
used the country turnover by Dreher et al. (2010) until the country entered the
euro area. We use the turnover of the president of the ECB from the time when
the country entered the monetary union.38
VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange volatility index available from Reuters
EIKON, ticker CBOEVIX(PI), [CBOE SPX VOLATILITY VIX (NEW) - PRICE IN-
DEX]. We use the VIX observed at the day before each forecasting date. The VIX
for a certain month can be different across data sets, since the forecast formation
dates might be different. For example, the VIX for WE countries in April 2001 is
taken on April 8 (forecasting date April 9), while for LA countries, it is taken on
April 22 (forecasting date April 23), 2001.
ZLB dummy is a dummy for the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
It is one if the short-term interest rate used to calculate the forecast errors is
below 0.5% and zero otherwise
CBI is the unweighted central bank independence index by Dincer & Eichen-
green (2014). It has annual observations from 1998 to 2010 and goes from zero
to one. Zero denotes no independence, one complete independence. We set the
index value in June of each year and interpolated over the remaining months.
GRC, SVN, CYP and SVK take the ECB values when joining the currency union.
For the following countries, there are no observations: CHE, DNK, EGY, HKG,
TWN, BGD, PAK, UKR, KAZ, BRA, URY, and GTM.
36 Source: Tom Warner (2004, October 25). Former banker steeled for Ukraine elections. The
Financial Times, p. 36, Edition 35,593.
37 Source: http://www.bankofcanada.ca/about/history/, March 2017.
38 These are GRC in 2001, SVN in 2007, CYP in 2008, SVK in 2009, EST in 2011, and LVA in 2014.
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IT We constructed a monthly dummy for inflation targeting (IT) central banks.
According to Hammond (2012), there are 24 inflation targeting countries. We
added the US from 201239 and JPN from 201340 to IT countries, which leads to
26 IT central banks in our sample.
FG is a dummy for forward guidance that we set based on Charbonneau &
Rennison (2015). Accordingly, the following central banks made use of forward
guidance: JPN from April 1999 to July 2000 and from October 2010 to March
2013, the US from December 2008 to December 2014 (end of our sample period),
CAN from April 2009 to April 2010, SWE from April 2009 to July 2010 and
February 2013 to December 2014, the ECB from July 2013 to December 2014, and
GBR from August 2013 to December 2014. All euro area countries are equated
with the ECB forward guidance dummy for the corresponding months. LVA is
given a value of 1 from January 2014 after joining the currency union.
Uncertainty is a monthly measure of macro uncertainty calculated by Jurado
et al. (2015).41 It covers three uncertainty horizons with a fixed window –
1-month, 3-month and 12-month. For interest rates and yields (financial vari-
ables), we picked the 3-month and 12-month macro uncertainty for the corre-
sponding forecast horizons. For the macroeconomic variables, we could only
use the 1-month and 3-month forecasts for the current year and the 12-month
forecast for the next year to match with the uncertainty measure.
Committee size is the number of members in the monetary policy committee.
We use Erhart & Vasquez-Paz (2007) as the source for the de jure number of
monetary policy committee members as of November 2006.42 We updated the
ECB’s governing council by the date when a country joined the euro area. A
number of countries are not included in the data set by Erhart & Vasquez-Paz
(2007). For these central banks, we use their size as reported on their websites
in spring 2017. This is the case for CHN (13), IND (8), TWN (11), THA (7), BGD
(9), UKR (6), AZE (5), URY (6), and GTM (6). The monetary policy committee
size for HKG and SLV is lacking.
39 https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20120125.pdf,
checked in April 2017.
40 https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf, checked in April
2017.
41 Downloaded under http://www.columbia.edu/~sn2294/pub.html, March 2017.
42 http://erhartsz.extra.hu/survey.xls, downloaded in April 2017.
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Freedom House annually establishes two freedom measures – Political Rights
and Civil Liberties.43 We assigned the values of both indicators to June of each
year and interpolated over the remaining months. The indicators are scaled
between 1 and 7, where 1 denotes the highest and 7 the lowest degree of freedom.
Freedom House reports values for all countries in our sample, except for HKG.
Heritage Foundation annually calculates an overall indicator for economic
freedom and its submeasures.44 For all variables, the corresponding annual
values were assumed to prevail in June of each year, followed by interpola-
tion over the remaining months. The Overall Score is the overall measure – the
higher the score, the higher the level of freedom (scale 0-100). The submeasures
for which we were able to download values are 1) Property Rights, 2) Govern-
ment Integrity, 3) Tax Burden, 4) Government Spending, 5) Business Freedom, 6)
Monetary Freedom, 7) Trade Freedom, 8) Investment Freedom and 9) Financial
Freedom, all scaled from 0 to 100. The higher the measure, the higher the level
of freedom. The indicators are available for all countries in our sample.
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) provide six measures at yearly fre-
quency for a broader dimension of good governance: 1) Control of Corrup-
tion, 2) Government Effectiveness, 3) Political Stability and Absence of Vio-
lence/Terrorism, 4) Regulation Quality, 5) Rule of Law, and 6) Voice and Ac-
countability.45 We again assigned each indicator’s annual value to the month
of June of the corresponding year and interpolated over the remaining months.
Since at the beginning these indicators were published every second year (1997,
1999 and 2001 are missing), we also interpolated over those years. We use the
”Estimate” given by WGI as the indicator measure which reaches values from
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. The mea-
sures are available for all countries in our sample.
|∆Oilt| is the absolute oil price change from the previous month, which we em-
ployed in the regressions underlying Figure 2. We took oil prices from Reuters
EIKON, ticker OILBRDT [Crude Oil Dated Brent U$/BBL]. The absolute price
change is constructed by means of an example for WE countries as follows. In
February 1998, we take the price of February 9, 1998 (when the forecast for
43 Downloaded from https://freedomhouse.org in February 2017.
44 Index downloaded from http://www.heritage.org in February 2017.
45 Data downloaded from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home in February
2017.
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February 1998 was made), subtract the price of January 12, 1998 (when the Jan-
uary 1998 forecast was made), and calculate the absolute value. For the LA and
EE areas, where the frequency of forecasts is every second month at the begin-
ning of the sample, we proceeded as follows, using LA as an example. The LA
countries have a forecast made on April 20, 1998. We take the oil price on this
day and subtract the oil price of the previous forecast formation date (February
16, 1998) and calculate the absolute value.
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Appendix 2 Further results
Appendix 2.1 Subindices
Table 7: Subindices and absolute cross-sectional mean forecast errors
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.010** 0.001 0.030 -0.023 0.190 0.003 -0.002 -0.061* 0.022*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
Transp.
political -0.411 -0.239 -0.532** -0.478** -1.009* 0.130 0.207* -0.530** -0.852
(0.25) (0.16) (0.23) (0.14) (0.44) (0.20) (0.10) (0.17) (1.78)
economic -0.098 -0.110 -0.151 -0.559* 0.209 -0.145* -0.143* -0.263 0.246
(0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.24) (0.70) (0.08) (0.07) (0.27) (0.52)
procedural 0.066 0.144 0.452 0.480*** -0.733 0.017 -0.101 0.092 -0.606
(0.21) (0.33) (0.29) (0.07) (0.76) (0.12) (0.16) (0.26) (0.37)
policy 0.129 0.163 -0.194 0.190 0.022 0.163* 0.198** 1.064* -0.039
(0.15) (0.24) (0.22) (0.16) (0.49) (0.08) (0.09) (0.39) (0.13)
operational -0.207 0.335 -0.268 1.216** 0.118 -0.342* -0.281** -2.389** -0.695
(0.21) (0.52) (0.21) (0.33) (0.56) (0.18) (0.11) (0.69) (0.77)
Turnover 0.135 -0.254 0.234 0.484** -0.010 -0.008 -0.029 -0.045 0.589**
(0.11) (0.25) (0.15) (0.16) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.18) (0.14)
VIX 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.006* 0.010 0.020* -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.009
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ZLB -0.073 -0.060 -0.423** 0.127* 0.044
(0.11) (0.17) (0.16) (0.06) (0.04)
N 8679 3610 2979 928 1162 5038 3603 1023 412
Countries 33 12 11 5 5 21 12 5 4
R2 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.31 0.44 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.09
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – continued from previous page
CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.024*** 0.017** 0.042 0.017** 0.017 0.014*** 0.006 0.050 -0.000 -0.038
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.10)
Transp.
political 0.045 -0.338 -0.014 0.691** 0.125 0.185* 0.419** 0.182 -0.034 0.387**
(0.11) (0.21) (0.14) (0.30) (0.11) (0.09) (0.18) (0.20) (0.12) (0.15)
economic 0.055 -0.016 -0.186 0.334* 0.207 0.121* 0.017 0.081 0.349** 0.160
(0.10) (0.20) (0.18) (0.17) (0.21) (0.07) (0.13) (0.22) (0.16) (0.11)
procedural 0.039 -0.028 0.249** -0.121 0.069 0.067 -0.089 0.389** -0.115 -0.260*
(0.09) (0.24) (0.11) (0.26) (0.17) (0.08) (0.12) (0.17) (0.14) (0.12)
policy 0.010 0.102 -0.038 -0.159 0.237 -0.013 0.117 -0.126 -0.052 -0.047
(0.10) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.09) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.12)
operational -0.171 -0.110 -0.025 -0.516** 0.020 -0.147 -0.328 -0.176 0.157 -0.310**
(0.13) (0.33) (0.27) (0.24) (0.17) (0.13) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.11)
Turnover 0.195** -0.007 0.043 0.113 0.463** 0.021 -0.016 0.109 0.030 -0.003
(0.08) (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.06) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15)
VIX 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 17873 7152 4365 4084 2272 17341 7032 4368 3681 2260
Countries 72 24 14 24 10 70 24 14 22 10
R2 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.36 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.22 0.19
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The table shows results for a fixed effects panel regression of the log of absolute cross-sectional mean forecast
errors for the sub-indices of transparency. We again include a dummy for forecast horizons. We also include
a dummy for each year (the intercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown in the table). All denotes all
countries, WE are the countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly Western countries), AP are the
countries in the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set, EE are the Eastern European countries, and LA are
the Latin-American Countries.
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Appendix 2.2 15 Subcomponents
Table 8: 15 subcomponents and absolute cross-sectional mean fore-
cast errors
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.011** 0.002 0.022 -0.012 0.188 0.000 -0.003 -0.055* 0.021*
(0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
Transp.
1a -0.525 -0.549 -1.209* -1.028 -3.046* -0.103 0.127 -0.642 0.352
(0.47) (0.35) (0.63) (0.57) (1.30) (0.39) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43)
1b -0.594 0.353 1.610*** -0.964 -1.695** 0.730** 0.185 0.899***
(0.36) (0.34) (0.42) (0.98) (0.43) (0.32) (0.16) (0.14)
1c 0.618 -2.191** 0.077 -0.757** -0.166 -0.452
(0.75) (0.78) (0.59) (0.34) (0.43) (0.43)
2a 0.557 -0.396 1.983*** -0.080 -1.124 -0.753 1.586
(0.77) (0.95) (0.33) (0.50) (0.82) (0.60) (1.25)
2b 0.091 0.036 0.085 -0.679 -0.170 -0.115 0.198 0.430
(0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.35) (0.14) (0.14) (0.57) (0.35)
2c 0.078 0.163 -0.744** 1.065** 0.205 -0.101 -0.177 0.266 0.781
(0.30) (0.19) (0.32) (0.36) (0.57) (0.19) (0.23) (0.62) (0.46)
3a -0.151 -0.265 1.727*** 0.707* -0.543 -0.007 -0.052
(0.35) (0.17) (0.31) (0.26) (0.71) (0.18) (0.23)
3b -0.048 1.200** -0.344 -0.058 0.456* -0.714
(0.44) (0.48) (0.25) (0.19) (0.21) (0.36)
3c 0.730** 1.684*** 0.672** 0.274 0.193 -0.598
(0.33) (0.24) (0.17) (0.19) (0.15) (0.53)
4a 0.259 -0.146 0.504 -0.114 1.289***
(0.34) (0.22) (1.02) (0.44) (0.42)
4b -0.608 -0.755 -1.044** 0.159 2.139 0.377 0.390 -0.224 -1.025*
(0.46) (0.46) (0.44) (0.72) (1.90) (0.29) (0.32) (0.29) (0.44)
4c 0.341 -0.118 -6.857*** -0.047 -0.018 -0.303
(0.31) (0.16) (1.23) (0.19) (0.15) (0.21)
5a 0.324 1.282** 6.819*** 3.369 -0.056 0.040
(0.40) (0.49) (1.08) (1.85) (0.24) (0.27)
5b -0.500 -0.387 -1.037** 0.528 -0.161 -0.269 -0.353 -5.114**
(0.41) (0.42) (0.36) (0.51) (0.60) (0.41) (0.31) (1.21)
5c -0.282 -4.493*** 0.937 0.706
(0.70) (0.52) (1.17) (1.07)
Turnover 0.118 -0.144 0.066 0.495** -0.071 0.014 -0.031 -0.006 0.413**
(0.09) (0.23) (0.16) (0.15) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.17) (0.08)
VIX 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.006* 0.010 0.020* -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.008
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ZLB -0.098 -0.068 -0.419*** 0.112* 0.039
(0.07) (0.18) (0.13) (0.05) (0.04)
N 8679 3610 2979 928 1162 5038 3603 1023 412
Countries 33 12 11 5 5 21 12 5 4
R2 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.44 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.10
Continued on next page
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Table 8 – continued from previous page
CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.024*** 0.012* 0.026 0.023** 0.051 0.014*** 0.007 0.033 -0.001 -0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.08)
Transp.
1a 0.303 -0.254 -0.615 0.667 -11.016* -0.549** 0.265 -1.568 -0.763** -3.191
(0.34) (0.57) (0.59) (0.48) (5.53) (0.27) (0.30) (1.11) (0.32) (3.53)
1b 0.200 0.029 0.699* 0.666 2.112** -0.017 0.177 -0.518 0.065 -0.878
(0.22) (0.63) (0.38) (0.46) (0.78) (0.18) (0.29) (0.62) (0.19) (0.49)
1c -0.322 -1.520*** 0.082 0.158 6.084* 0.650** 1.581*** 3.279** 0.294 3.552
(0.36) (0.46) (0.76) (0.77) (3.11) (0.27) (0.43) (1.29) (0.44) (2.17)
2a -0.083 0.398 0.803 -0.366 -1.940** 0.137 -1.741*** 0.613 0.427 2.424***
(0.37) (1.18) (0.47) (0.51) (0.72) (0.32) (0.59) (0.63) (0.41) (0.74)
2b -0.052 -0.210 -0.258 0.379 -0.071 -0.191 0.307 0.063
(0.17) (0.24) (0.31) (0.27) (0.13) (0.24) (0.27) (0.19)
2c 0.173 0.477 -0.848** -0.081 0.338 0.250** 0.343* -0.011 0.482* 0.223
(0.17) (0.37) (0.33) (0.26) (0.34) (0.13) (0.18) (0.62) (0.26) (0.29)
3a 0.042 0.112 0.082 -0.190 -1.170 0.147 0.247 0.614** -0.267 -0.356
(0.16) (0.36) (0.20) (0.32) (0.68) (0.14) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.46)
3b -0.231 -0.887*** 0.557 -0.699* 1.605 0.095 0.076 0.303 -0.273 0.386
(0.26) (0.28) (0.46) (0.38) (1.33) (0.15) (0.31) (0.45) (0.16) (0.56)
3c 0.254 0.312 1.365* 1.252** -1.098 -0.196 -0.166 -0.394 0.401 1.203**
(0.29) (0.43) (0.73) (0.49) (0.85) (0.33) (0.51) (1.14) (0.36) (0.41)
4a -0.013 0.066 0.382 -0.316 0.924 -0.035 0.229 0.045 -0.583 -0.640
(0.22) (0.39) (0.43) (0.37) (0.59) (0.16) (0.25) (0.46) (0.37) (0.49)
4b -0.033 -0.331 -0.628 0.232 -2.421 -0.190 0.146 -0.367 0.523 -1.141
(0.37) (0.54) (0.92) (0.42) (1.37) (0.27) (0.46) (0.68) (0.37) (2.22)
4c 0.376 0.236 1.235 -0.531 0.400 0.566 1.837** -0.352
(0.33) (0.38) (1.72) (0.45) (0.39) (0.52) (0.76) (0.31)
5a -0.525* 0.310 0.004 -0.424 -1.019 -0.138 -0.698*** -1.228 0.914** 2.723**
(0.30) (0.49) (1.01) (0.42) (1.52) (0.22) (0.20) (0.94) (0.36) (0.96)
5b -0.341 -0.717 -0.357 -0.412 0.271 -0.164 -0.039 0.259 0.093 -0.407
(0.27) (0.63) (0.35) (0.55) (1.08) (0.26) (0.37) (0.63) (0.34) (0.83)
5c 0.295 0.610 0.216 -0.967 -0.897 -0.297 0.115 -0.320 -0.613 0.004
(0.37) (1.07) (0.31) (1.01) (1.37) (0.35) (0.35) (0.68) (0.75) (0.64)
Turnover 0.199** 0.054 -0.009 0.079 0.499** 0.021 -0.045 0.093 0.030 0.037
(0.08) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16)
VIX 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 17873 7152 4365 4084 2272 17341 7032 4368 3681 2260
Countries 72 24 14 24 10 70 24 14 22 10
R2 0.28 0.29 0.41 0.37 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.23 0.22
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The table shows results for a fixed effects panel regression of the log of absolute cross-
sectional mean forecast errors for the 15 subcomponents of transparency. We again
include a dummy for forecast horizons. We also include a dummy for each year (the in-
tercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown in the table). All denotes all countries,
WE are the countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly Western countries),
AP are the countries in the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set, EE are the Eastern
European countries, and LA are the Latin-American Countries.
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Appendix 2.3 Subsamples of lower and higher transparency (break-
point 10)
Table 9: Lower and higher transparency and absolute cross-sectional
mean forecast errors (breakpoint 10)
Lower part (Transp. < 10)
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.021 -0.014* 0.012 -0.266*** 0.033 -0.030** -0.021 -0.061*** -0.045***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Transp. -0.090 0.417** -0.203** 0.363* -0.100 0.068 0.127* -0.086 -0.318
(0.08) (0.15) (0.06) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.25) (0.24)
Turnover 0.305*** -0.009 0.344** 0.903** 0.177 0.186 0.126 0.448 0.262
(0.08) (0.19) (0.14) (0.28) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.21) (0.18)
VIX 0.008** 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.019* 0.002 0.015** -0.006 0.004*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
ZLB -0.944*** -0.883*** -1.128*** -0.344* -0.320
(0.10) (0.24) (0.16) (0.17) (0.27)
N 6253 1064 3204 444 1541 2083 1056 913 114
Countries 30 10 10 5 5 17 10 5 2
R2 0.27 0.21 0.32 0.35 0.40 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.04
CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.025* -0.015* 0.070*** 0.008 -0.041 0.021 0.006 0.054 0.008 -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06)
Transp. 0.063 0.281 -0.073 0.042 0.118** 0.006 0.034 -0.001 0.009 0.025
(0.05) (0.17) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.13) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05)
Turnover 0.181* 0.021 0.104 0.141 0.347* 0.093 0.058 0.154 0.005 0.032
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.16) (0.06) (0.19) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12)
VIX -0.001 -0.008** 0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 16299 3584 4837 4874 3004 15215 3428 4756 4183 2848
Countries 68 21 13 24 10 68 21 13 24 10
R2 0.26 0.26 0.39 0.31 0.21 0.13 0.06 0.18 0.23 0.20
Continued on next page
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Table 9 – continued from previous page
Upper part (Transp. ≥ 10)
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.003 0.002 -0.016 -0.009 0.004** 0.004 0.037 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
Transp. 0.149 0.256 -0.258 -0.004 -0.099* -0.099 -0.354*** -0.223
(0.09) (0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.05) (0.09) (0.01) (0.36)
Turnover -0.019 -0.124 -0.498 0.774* -0.107 -0.195* 0.234*** 0.331**
(0.11) (0.09) (0.34) (0.30) (0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10)
VIX 0.008*** 0.009** 0.003 0.010 -0.002 -0.003 0.011* -0.007
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZLB -0.714*** -0.709*** -0.241 -0.863** 0.106 0.133 0.111
(0.18) (0.20) (0.37) (0.26) (0.12) (0.14) (0.30)
N 5433 3697 773 963 5072 3699 691 682
Countries 22 12 5 5 20 12 4 4
R2 0.31 0.38 0.36 0.28 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.24
CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.012*** 0.009** -0.037 0.006 0.002 0.000 -0.036 -0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
Transp. -0.076 -0.018 0.027 -0.339** -0.002 -0.091 0.098 -0.123
(0.09) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.06) (0.08) (0.34) (0.19)
Turnover 0.125 0.182 0.072 0.006 0.052 0.203 -0.303 0.241
(0.08) (0.13) (0.25) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.23)
VIX 0.002 0.002 -0.009 0.009 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 8294 5872 920 1502 8282 5872 920 1490
Countries 33 19 5 9 33 19 5 9
R2 0.35 0.32 0.41 0.53 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.22
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The table shows results for a fixed-effects panel regression of the log of absolute cross-sectional mean
forecast errors. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast horizons (3 and 12 months), while CPI Inflation
and Real GDP Growth are forecasts for this year and next (24 different forecast horizons). We include a
dummy for each forecast horizon. Interest Rates and Yields have a dummy for 12-month forecast horizons;
the other two variables have a dummy for each of the 23 forecast horizons. We also include a dummy for
each year (the intercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown in the table). We divide the sample into
two parts, one with all transparency values below 10 and the other with all values equal to or above 10. All
denotes all countries, WE are the countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly Western countries),
AP are the countries in the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set, EE are the Eastern European countries,
and LA are the Latin-American Countries. Note that LA has no transparency observations above 10.
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Appendix 2.4 CBI
Table 10: CBI by Dincer & Eichengreen (2014) and absolute cross-
sectional mean forecast errors
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.008 -0.000 0.022 -0.025 0.129 0.001 -0.001 -0.065 0.018***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Transp. -0.092 0.012 -0.188** 0.282** -0.234 -0.029 -0.040 0.054 0.102
(0.09) (0.14) (0.07) (0.09) (0.26) (0.04) (0.04) (0.16) (0.06)
CBI 1.398* 0.884 -3.624* -0.097 14.098 0.924* 1.244*** -2.577** -12.381
(0.72) (0.61) (1.79) (2.09) (10.13) (0.48) (0.15) (0.90) (6.05)
VIX 0.010*** 0.011** 0.006** 0.012 0.017 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.010
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ZLB -0.153 -0.031 -0.466* 0.126* 0.081
(0.14) (0.21) (0.25) (0.07) (0.05)
N 7609 3299 2599 780 931 4684 3301 1023 360
Countries 30 11 10 5 4 20 11 5 4
R2 0.21 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.45 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.08
CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.038 -0.010 -0.075 0.013** 0.003 0.036 0.002 -0.059
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.12)
Transp. -0.058 -0.033 -0.020 0.004 -0.175 -0.006 0.056 0.015 0.006 -0.139
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.26) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11) (0.04) (0.15)
CBI 0.061 0.287 -0.462 0.321 0.000 1.748*** 0.805** 2.505 1.617** 2.008***
(0.67) (0.90) (1.44) (1.39) (0.95) (0.42) (0.31) (2.92) (0.63) (0.44)
VIX 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 14583 6216 3361 3326 1680 14130 6096 3364 3002 1668
Countries 61 21 11 22 7 59 21 11 20 7
R2 0.27 0.28 0.40 0.34 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.23
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The table shows results for a fixed effects-panel regression of the log of absolute cross-sectional mean forecast
errors. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast horizons (3 and 12 months) while CPI Inflation and Real
GDP Growth are forecasts for this year and next (24 different forecast horizons). We include a dummy for
each forecast horizon. Interest Rates and Yields have a dummy for 12-month forecast horizons; the other
two variables have a dummy for each of the 23 forecast horizons. We also include a dummy for each year
(the intercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown in the table). All denotes all countries, WE are the
countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly Western countries), AP are the countries in the Asia
Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set, EE are the Eastern European countries, and LA are the Latin-American
Countries. Turnover is replaced by the central bank independence index (CBI) of Dincer & Eichengreen (2014).
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Appendix 2.5 Inflation targeting
Table 11: Inflation targeting
CPI Inflation
Absolute cross-sectional mean forecast error Cross-sectional standard deviation
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.018*** 0.017** 0.062*** 0.005 -0.046 0.008** 0.004 0.022 -0.004 -0.003
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.07)
Transp. 0.031 0.019 0.081 0.062 0.131** -0.091** -0.015 -0.042 0.035 0.012
(0.03) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09)
IT -0.436** -0.032 -0.858*** -0.620 -0.774*** -0.311 0.094 -0.443*** -0.634** -0.570
(0.18) (0.14) (0.24) (0.37) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.11) (0.26) (0.37)
Turnover 0.161** 0.026 0.091 0.036 0.322* 0.109 -0.050 0.026 0.004 0.325*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.15)
VIX -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003 0.001 0.006***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 24593 9456 5757 6376 3004 14942 4756 4266 3440 2480
Countries 73 24 15 24 10 45 12 12 14 7
R2 0.28 0.28 0.38 0.35 0.22 0.47 0.66 0.61 0.66 0.37
Interest Rates
Absolute cross-sectional mean forecast error Cross-sectional standard deviation
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.016 0.033 0.006 0.002 0.020 -0.016 0.133
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10)
Transp. -0.007 0.002 0.003 0.134 -0.100 -0.049 0.012 0.026 0.096 -0.157
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)
IT -0.353 -0.287 -0.809** 0.642* -0.478** -0.252 -0.740** -0.531
(0.24) (0.34) (0.32) (0.28) (0.19) (0.16) (0.25) (0.31)
Turnover 0.206** -0.056 0.277** 0.612* 0.177 0.129 0.008 0.041 0.214 0.197*
(0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.24) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09)
VIX 0.008*** 0.009** 0.003 0.009* 0.019* 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.005 0.010*** 0.014**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZLB -0.729*** -0.446** -1.186*** -0.756 -0.291** -0.335** -0.605*** 0.198
(0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.38) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.32)
N 11686 4761 3977 1407 1541 11811 4756 4051 1457 1547
Countries 34 12 12 5 5 34 12 12 5 5
R2 0.27 0.36 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.23 0.37 0.38 0.65 0.12
Continued on next page
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Table 11 – continued from previous page
Yields
Absolute cross-sectional mean forecast error Cross-sectional standard deviation
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.004 0.005** -0.048 0.008 0.005** 0.006* -0.018 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Transp. -0.007 -0.058** -0.068 0.046 -0.056* -0.043 -0.011 -0.008
(0.06) (0.03) (0.20) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
IT -0.353 -0.059 0.552 -0.366** -0.099 -0.653***
(0.24) (0.29) (0.41) (0.17) (0.10) (0.05)
Turnover 0.206** -0.124 0.231 0.211* 0.079** 0.036 0.141** 0.012
(0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08)
VIX 0.008*** -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZLB -0.729*** 0.063 -0.085 0.140** 0.072 0.261
(0.13) (0.09) (0.28) (0.07) (0.07) (0.20)
N 11686 4755 1604 796 7714 4756 2158 800
Countries 34 12 7 4 23 12 7 4
R2 0.27 0.23 0.14 0.21 0.33 0.36 0.43 0.34
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The table shows results for a fixed effects-panel regression of the log of forecasts’ cross-sectional absolute
mean error and standard deviation. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast horizons (3 and 12 months),
while CPI Inflation are forecasts for this year and next (24 different forecast horizons). We include a dummy
for each forecast horizon. Interest Rates and Yields have a dummy for 12-month forecast horizons; CPI
Inflation has a dummy for each of the 23 forecast horizons. We also include a dummy for each year (the
intercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown in the table). All denotes all countries, WE are the
countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly Western countries), AP are the countries in the Asia
Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set, EE are the Eastern European countries, and LA are the Latin-American
Countries. IT is the inflation targeting dummy.
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Appendix 2.6 Forward guidance
Table 12: Forward Guidance - Absolute cross-sectional mean forecast
errors and forecasts’ cross-sectional standard deviation
Absolute cross-sectional mean forecast errors
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.022* 0.033 0.005* 0.005** -0.049 0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
Transp. -0.032 -0.020 -0.125 0.158 -0.100 -0.072* -0.061*** -0.068 0.063
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.20) (0.18)
FG 0.121 0.057 0.346 0.160 0.106 0.399**
(0.18) (0.20) (0.44) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Turnover 0.205** -0.043 0.262** 0.639* 0.177 0.028 -0.118 0.233 0.220*
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.25) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09)
VIX 0.008*** 0.009** 0.003 0.009* 0.019* -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZLB -0.772*** -0.466** -1.169*** -0.890 0.084 0.023 -0.169
(0.16) (0.21) (0.12) (0.53) (0.09) (0.09) (0.24)
N 11686 4761 3977 1407 1541 7155 4755 1604 796
Countries 34 12 12 5 5 23 12 7 4
R2 0.27 0.36 0.30 0.29 0.40 0.18 0.23 0.14 0.22
Forecasts’ cross-sectional standard deviation
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.009** 0.003 0.024 -0.011* 0.133 0.006** 0.006* -0.014 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Transp. -0.086** -0.012 -0.093* 0.078 -0.157 -0.099** -0.052 -0.130* -0.000
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
FG -0.228* -0.258** -0.398 -0.038 -0.029 0.215
(0.13) (0.10) (0.40) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14)
Turnover 0.122 0.008 0.031 0.198 0.197* 0.079** 0.039 0.109** 0.017
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08)
VIX 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.005 0.010*** 0.014** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZLB -0.208 -0.235* -0.588*** 0.406 0.147** 0.084 0.216
(0.17) (0.12) (0.10) (0.41) (0.07) (0.09) (0.19)
N 11811 4756 4051 1457 1547 7714 4756 2158 800
Countries 34 12 12 5 5 23 12 7 4
R2 0.23 0.38 0.37 0.64 0.12 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.35
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table shows results for a fixed-effects panel regression of the log of abso-
lute cross-sectional mean forecast errors. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast horizons (3 and 12
months). We include a dummy for the 12-month forecast horizon. We also include a dummy for each
year (the intercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown in the table). All denotes all countries, WE
are the countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly Western countries), AP are the countries
in the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set, EE are the Eastern European countries, and LA are the
Latin-American Countries. FG is a dummy for forward guidance.
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Appendix 3 Robustness
Appendix 3.1 Absolute forecast errors with 3-month and 12-month
forecast horizons
Table 13: Absolute cross-sectional mean forecast errors of separate
forecast horizons (3- and 12-month)
3-month forecast horizon
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.008* 0.006 0.027 -0.024 0.154 0.006 0.007* -0.054 -0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01)
Transp. -0.044 -0.026 -0.152** 0.085 -0.141 -0.051 -0.036 -0.090 0.001
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.14) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.21) (0.23)
Turnover 0.126 -0.191 0.261** 0.684** 0.051 0.032 -0.119 0.317* 0.300***
(0.10) (0.14) (0.09) (0.23) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.03)
VIX 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.013** 0.016 0.016 0.011*** 0.010** 0.012* 0.013
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ZLB -0.723*** -0.414* -1.211*** -0.460 0.068 0.028 -0.299
(0.16) (0.19) (0.18) (0.51) (0.11) (0.11) (0.35)
N 5828 2379 1981 703 765 3565 2377 792 396
Countries 34 12 12 5 5 23 12 7 4
R2 0.21 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.29 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.19
12-month forecast horizon
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.002 -0.001 -0.015 -0.013 -0.082* 0.004 0.002 -0.044 0.018
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
Transp. -0.021 -0.015 -0.098 0.230 -0.061 -0.103* -0.089*** -0.052 0.043
(0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.05) (0.02) (0.22) (0.24)
Turnover 0.281*** 0.100 0.266 0.590 0.301* 0.016 -0.125 0.144 0.120
(0.09) (0.12) (0.16) (0.32) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14)
VIX 0.001 0.001 -0.007 0.002 0.021*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.010 -0.024
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ZLB -0.736*** -0.473** -1.121*** -1.166** 0.233* 0.099 0.117
(0.12) (0.16) (0.21) (0.31) (0.12) (0.10) (0.24)
N 5858 2382 1996 704 776 3590 2378 812 400
Countries 34 12 12 5 5 23 12 7 4
R2 0.23 0.35 0.23 0.29 0.36 0.19 0.27 0.10 0.26
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table shows results for a fixed-effects panel regression of the log of absolute
cross-sectional mean forecast errors. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast horizons (3 and 12
months). We include a dummy for each year (the intercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown
in the table). All denotes all countries, WE are the countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly
Western countries), AP are the countries in the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set, EE are the
Eastern European countries, and LA are the Latin-American Countries.
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Table 14: Cross-sectional standard deviation of separate forecast hori-
zons (3- and 12-month)
3-month forecast horizon
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.013*** 0.008** 0.037* -0.014 0.269 0.007** 0.008* -0.015 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Transp. -0.090* -0.016 -0.087 0.042 -0.272 -0.107** -0.043 -0.147* -0.082
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.16) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05)
Turnover 0.165** 0.089 0.040 0.186 0.218* 0.104** 0.071 0.137*** -0.036
(0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.14) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07)
VIX 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.006 0.013*** 0.022** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.009
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZLB -0.349* -0.410** -0.778*** 0.338 0.118 0.049 0.220
(0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.42) (0.07) (0.08) (0.18)
N 5895 2378 2020 727 770 3855 2378 1077 400
Countries 34 12 12 5 5 23 12 7 4
R2 0.12 0.19 0.26 0.55 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.31 0.27
12-month forecast horizon
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.002 -0.002 0.012 -0.016* 0.004 0.005** 0.004* -0.012 0.004**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Transp. -0.082** -0.001 -0.099* 0.116 -0.041 -0.091** -0.059* -0.113* 0.065
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Turnover 0.087 -0.055 0.021 0.218** 0.177 0.056* 0.009 0.080* 0.060
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09)
VIX 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004* 0.007* 0.006 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZLB -0.207 -0.257** -0.392*** 0.375 0.144* 0.097 0.303
(0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.30) (0.07) (0.08) (0.23)
N 5916 2378 2031 730 777 3859 2378 1081 400
Countries 34 12 12 5 5 23 12 7 4
R2 0.34 0.39 0.46 0.65 0.43 0.17 0.15 0.34 0.25
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table shows results for a fixed-effects panel regression of the log of forecasts’
cross-sectional standard deviation. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast horizons (3 and 12 months).
We include a dummy for each year (the intercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown in the table).
All denotes all countries, WE are the countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly Western
countries), AP are the countries in the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set, EE are the Eastern
European countries, and LA are the Latin-American Countries.
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Appendix 3.2 Exclude euro area countries except Germany
Table 15: Absolute cross-sectional mean forecast errors excluding
euro area
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.006 -0.001 0.005 -0.071 0.033 0.003 0.007* -0.049 -0.059
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03)
Transp. -0.006 0.008 -0.125 0.261** -0.100 -0.064 -0.069*** -0.068 0.303**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.20) (0.06)
Turnover 0.216** 0.022 0.262** 0.294 0.177 0.056 -0.053 0.233 0.114
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.14)
VIX 0.006** 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.019* -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.007
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
ZLB -0.639*** -0.351* -1.169*** -0.387* 0.033 -0.037 -0.325
(0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.17)
N 9859 3225 3977 1116 1541 5423 3219 1604 600
Countries 29 8 12 4 5 18 8 7 3
R2 0.26 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.40 0.17 0.25 0.14 0.20
CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.027*** 0.017** 0.061*** -0.085 -0.041 0.013 0.004 0.042 0.011 -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Transp. 0.044 0.070 -0.041 0.079 0.118** 0.048 -0.007 0.085 0.070 0.025
(0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05)
Turnover 0.205*** 0.078 0.103 0.117 0.347* 0.068 0.048 0.098 -0.025 0.032
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12)
VIX -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 19499 6048 5757 4690 3004 18403 5892 5676 3987 2848
Countries 58 15 15 18 10 58 15 15 18 10
R2 0.26 0.24 0.38 0.33 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.20
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table shows results for a fixed-effects panel regression of the log of
absolute cross-sectional mean forecast errors. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast horizons (3
and 12 months), while CPI Inflation and Real GDP Growth are forecasts for this year and next (24
different forecast horizons). We include a dummy for each forecast horizon. Interest Rates and Yields
have a dummy for 12-month forecast horizons; the other two variables have a dummy for each of the
23 forecast horizons. We also include a dummy for each year (the intercept, fixed effects, and dummies
are not shown in the table). All denotes all countries, WE are the countries in the Consensus Forecasts
data set (mainly Western countries), AP are the countries in the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts data
set, EE are the Eastern European countries, and LA are the Latin-American Countries. We exclude all
euro area countries except DEU (euro area countries are in WE and EE).
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Table 16: Forecasts’ cross-sectional standard deviation excluding euro area
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.014** 0.005 0.024 -0.052 0.133 -0.001 0.001 -0.014 0.023
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.07)
Transp. -0.087* -0.001 -0.093* 0.024 -0.157 -0.090* -0.030 -0.130* 0.029
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Turnover 0.108 -0.034 0.031 0.124 0.197* 0.080** 0.032 0.109** 0.101
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07)
VIX 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.005 0.008*** 0.014** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZLB -0.296 -0.407** -0.588*** 0.432 0.099 0.059 0.005
(0.18) (0.14) (0.10) (0.52) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12)
N 9983 3220 4051 1165 1547 5978 3220 2158 600
Countries 29 8 12 4 5 18 8 7 3
R2 0.21 0.33 0.37 0.63 0.12 0.34 0.41 0.40 0.37
CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.010*** -0.003 0.024 -0.025 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.011 -0.031 -0.071*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Transp. -0.112*** -0.001 -0.113 0.031 0.013 -0.017 0.003 -0.064 0.015 0.001
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06)
Turnover 0.109 -0.019 0.018 -0.079* 0.351* 0.060 -0.006 0.034 0.039 0.081
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.16) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09)
VIX 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003 0.001 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.007***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 14942 3220 4266 2412 2480 12378 3220 4266 2412 2480
Countries 45 8 12 9 7 36 8 12 9 7
R2 0.46 0.69 0.60 0.64 0.35 0.47 0.56 0.57 0.50 0.46
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. The table shows results for a fixed-effects panel regression of the log of forecasts’ cross-sectional
standard deviation. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast horizons (3 and 12 months) while CPI Inflation
and Real GDP Growth are forecasts for this year and next (24 different forecast horizons). We include a dummy
for each forecast horizon. Interest Rates and Yields have a dummy for 12-month forecast horizons; the other
two variables have a dummy for each of the 23 forecast horizons. We also include a dummy for each year (the
intercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown in the table). All denotes all countries, WE are the countries
in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly Western countries), AP are the countries in the Asia Pacific Consensus
Forecasts data set, EE are the Eastern European countries, and LA are the Latin-American Countries. We exclude
all euro area countries except DEU (euro area countries are in WE and EE).
65
Appendix 3.3 Jurado et al. (2015) macroeconomic uncertainty
measure
Table 17: Macro uncertainty Jurado et al. (2015) and absolute cross-
sectional mean forecast errors
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.006 0.003 0.006 -0.018 0.034 0.005** 0.005** -0.048 0.008
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
Transp. -0.033 -0.022 -0.125* 0.156 -0.097 -0.076* -0.063*** -0.071 0.033
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.04) (0.02) (0.20) (0.19)
Turnover 0.204** -0.045 0.262** 0.636* 0.178 0.025 -0.122 0.233 0.208*
(0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.25) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08)
Uncertainty 2.883*** 3.492*** 2.341*** 2.607* 2.815 0.124 -0.747* 1.487 1.100
(0.41) (0.51) (0.68) (1.01) (1.80) (0.39) (0.36) (0.78) (0.97)
ZLB -0.732*** -0.449** -1.152*** -0.827* 0.150 0.064 -0.087
(0.13) (0.18) (0.12) (0.38) (0.10) (0.09) (0.27)
N 11686 4761 3977 1407 1541 7155 4755 1604 796
Countries 34 12 12 5 5 23 12 7 4
R2 0.27 0.36 0.30 0.29 0.40 0.18 0.23 0.14 0.22
CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.021*** 0.020** 0.072** 0.009 -0.300 0.017*** -0.002 0.039 0.029** 0.141
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.31) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.16)
Transp. 0.010 -0.092 0.051 0.068 0.143* 0.021 -0.004 0.023 0.037 -0.040
(0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
Turnover 0.280*** 0.317** 0.266** 0.119 0.333* 0.015 0.124 -0.170* 0.108 0.058
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.17) (0.12)
Uncertainty -1.224*** -0.267 0.112 -0.683 -4.984*** 0.510 1.051* 0.070 1.726*** -2.739
(0.46) (0.62) (0.66) (1.01) (1.30) (0.46) (0.60) (0.96) (0.53) (1.95)
N 3169 1182 720 898 369 3029 1164 714 800 351
Countries 73 24 15 24 10 73 24 15 24 10
R2 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.28 0.30 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.23
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table shows results for a fixed effects-panel regression of the log of absolute
cross-sectional mean forecast errors. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast horizons (3 and 12 months),
while CPI Inflation and Real GDP Growth are forecasts for this year and next (24 different forecast horizons).
We include a dummy for each forecast horizon. Interest Rates and Yields have a dummy for 12-month
forecast horizons; the other two variables have a dummy for each of the 23 forecast horizons. We also include
a dummy for each year (the intercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown in the table). All denotes all
countries, WE are the countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly Western countries), AP are the
countries in the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set, EE are the Eastern European countries, and LA are
the Latin-American Countries. VIX is replaced by the macro uncertainty measure of Jurado et al. (2015).
66
Table 18: Macro uncertainty Jurado et al. (2015) and forecasts’ cross-
sectional standard deviation
Interest Rates Yields
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.008** 0.004 0.024 -0.014 0.133 0.006** 0.006** -0.014 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Transp. -0.086** -0.008 -0.093* 0.078 -0.153 -0.099** -0.051 -0.130* -0.007
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
Turnover 0.126* 0.016 0.030 0.202 0.200* 0.080** 0.039 0.109** 0.011
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08)
Uncertainty 1.972*** 1.944*** 1.659*** 1.730** 2.913** 1.095*** 0.818*** 1.773*** 1.034*
(0.20) (0.15) (0.39) (0.48) (0.93) (0.16) (0.09) (0.42) (0.39)
ZLB -0.281* -0.340** -0.579*** 0.347 0.128* 0.069 0.253
(0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.36) (0.07) (0.07) (0.19)
N 11811 4756 4051 1457 1547 7714 4756 2158 800
Countries 34 12 12 5 5 23 12 7 4
R2 0.23 0.37 0.37 0.64 0.12 0.32 0.35 0.40 0.34
CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth
All WE AP EE LA All WE AP EE LA
Speech 0.014*** 0.011** 0.030 -0.001 -0.087 -0.006 -0.007 0.017 -0.011* -0.117
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06)
Transp. -0.118** -0.033 -0.093 0.061 0.050 -0.010 0.003 -0.074 0.074** -0.010
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.11)
Turnover 0.128 -0.002 0.024 0.073 0.318 0.033 -0.110* 0.021 0.061 0.119
(0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
Uncertainty 0.002 0.153 0.170 -0.068 1.789 -0.071 0.155 -0.356 0.177 -0.215
(0.31) (0.32) (0.54) (0.66) (1.05) (0.25) (0.40) (0.46) (0.53) (0.64)
N 1914 597 534 480 303 1914 597 534 480 303
Countries 45 12 12 14 7 45 12 12 14 7
R2 0.35 0.38 0.49 0.64 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.32
Country fixed-effects panel regression with panel clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table shows results for a fixed effects-panel regression of the log of forecasts’
cross-sectional standard deviation. Interest Rates and Yields have two forecast horizons (3 and 12 months),
while CPI Inflation and Real GDP Growth are forecasts for this year and next (24 different forecast horizons).
We include a dummy for each forecast horizon. Interest Rates and Yields have a dummy for 12-month fore-
cast horizons; the other two variables have a dummy for each of the 23 forecast horizons. We also include a
dummy for each year (the intercept, fixed effects, and dummies are not shown in the table). All denotes all
countries, WE are the countries in the Consensus Forecasts data set (mainly Western countries), AP are the
countries in the Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts data set, EE are the Eastern European countries, and LA are
the Latin-American Countries. VIX is replaced by the macro uncertainty measure of Jurado et al. (2015).
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Appendix 3.4 Good Governance indicators and central bank trans-
parency
Table 19: Correlation between central
bank transparency and governance and
freedom indicators
Speech 0.42
Turnover -0.05
VIX -0.07
Freedom House
Political Rights -0.61
Civil Liberties -0.69
Heritage Foundation
Overall Score 0.52
Property Rights 0.58
Government Integrity 0.60
Tax Burden -0.43
Government Spending -0.49
Business Freedom 0.53
Monetary Freedom 0.42
Trade Freedom 0.58
Investment Freedom 0.50
Financial Freedom 0.53
Worldwide Governance Indicators
Control of Corruption 0.62
Government Effectiveness 0.66
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 0.48
Regulation Quality 0.67
Rule of Law 0.67
Voice and Accountability 0.69
Correlation with the transparency index.
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Appendix 4 How can a central bank increase disagree-
ment among forecasters?
A central bank may increase disagreement by decreasing its signal precision.
For example, in the last period, the central bank may have announced that it
expected interest rates at 2% with high certainty. This is a public signal provided
by the central bank. In the current period, however, it announces an expectation
of interest rates at 2% but with high uncertainty. We interpret a signal as a
speech held by a central bank representative. We solve this example in a Bayesian
expectations framework. Assume a signal from the central bank given by y =
θ + η (public information), where θ is the future interest rate drawn by nature
and η is the error contained in the signal. Assume η ∼ N(0, 1/α). Forecaster i
also observes a private signal xi = θ + ei with ei ∼ N(0, 1/β). Thus xi is private
information.46 The errors in the two signals y and xi are uncorrelated with each
other and with the state θ. In addition, there is a common prior about θ that
equals N(µ, 1/τ). The joint distribution is written as θxi
y
 ∼ N

µθ
θ
 ,
1/τ 1/τ 1/τ1/τ 1/τ + 1/β 1/τ
1/τ 1/τ 1/τ + 1/α


with 1/τ the variance of the prior, 1/α the variance of the error in the central
bank’s signal and 1/β the variance of the error in the private signal. Hence,
α denotes central bank’s signal precision. The larger (smaller) the α, the more
(less) precise the public signal by the central bank. The forecasters’ prediction of
θ following Bayesian expectations equals
E [θ|xi, y] = τα + β + τµ +
β
α + β + τ
xi +
α
α + β + τ
y
and the cross-sectional variance of forecasts is
V [E [θ|xi, y]] = β(α + β + τ)2
In our framework, this variance corresponds to forecast disagreement among the
forecasters. Disagreement can be changed either by changing the uncertainty of
46 Private information gives rise to forecast disagreement. If there were no private information,
all forecasters would come up with the same forecast, and thus, there would be no disagree-
ment.
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forecasters, i.e., a change in τ, by changing forecasters’ private signal precision,
i.e. a change in β, or by changing the central bank’s signal precision, i.e., a
change in α. The first derivative of the variance with respect to α is
∂V [E [θ|xi, y]]
∂α
= −2 β
(α + β + τ)3
< 0
We see that the smaller α, the higher the disagreement among forecasters. Hence,
higher disagreement may be due to less-precise signals sent by the central bank.
We can connect this statement to the number of speeches held by central bank
representatives. Assume two signals are sent by the central bank in a period y1
and y2 with a similar form as before (y1 = θ + η1 and y2 = θ + η2). Interpreting
two signals as two speeches held in a period, the joint distribution is as follows
θ
xi
y1
y2
 ∼ N


µi
θ
θ
θ
 ,

1/τ 1/τ 1/τ 1/τ
1/τ 1/τ + 1/β 1/τ 1/τ
1/τ 1/τ 1/τ + 1/α 1/τ + ρ/α
1/τ 1/τ 1/τ + ρ/α 1/τ + 1/α


where ρ is the correlation between the two signals’ errors with |ρ|< 1. The
forecast is
E [θ|xi, y1, y2] = (1 + ρ)τ2α + (1 + ρ)β + (1 + ρ)τµ +
(1 + ρ)β
2α + (1 + ρ)β + (1 + ρ)τ
xi
+
α
2α + (1 + ρ)β + (1 + ρ)τ
y1 +
α
2α + (1 + ρ)β + (1 + ρ)τ
y2
with cross-sectional variance of forecasts
V [E [θ|xi, y1, y2]] = (1 + ρ)
2β
(2α + (1 + ρ)β + (1 + ρ)τ)2
What is the relation of the two forecast variances (disagreement) arising from
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one signal and from two signals?
β
(α + β + τ)2
?
(1 + ρ)2β
(2α + (1 + ρ)(β + τ))2
(2α + (1 + ρ)(β + τ))2 ? (1 + ρ)2(α + β + τ)2
2α + (1 + ρ)(β + τ) ? (1 + ρ)(α + β + τ)
2α ? (1 + ρ)α
2 > (1 + ρ)
We see that the disagreement with two signals is strictly smaller than with one
signal, even if there is high correlation in the error, i.e. a ρ close to but smaller
than 1. We can safely exclude ρ = 1 because this would imply that the central
bank conveys two exactly identical signals. Therefore, more speeches should
decrease disagreement. Empirically, we find the opposite. The more speeches,
the higher the disagreement. In our Bayesian framework, this finding is possible
if either i) the precision of signals decreases in the number of speeches (α be-
comes smaller the more signals are sent), ii) the forecasters’ certainty decreases
(τ becomes smaller the more signals are sent by the central bank), iii) or both.47
Note that a central bank decides on the precision (α) and number of its signals.
However, a central bank cannot steer forecasters’ certainty (τ) directly. There-
fore, we assume that a central bank can influence forecasters’ uncertainty τ by
sending more signals or changing its precision α. In other words, we assume τ
to be endogenous.
To see the first case – i) a decrease in signal precision α – rename precision α α1
in the model with one signal and α2 in the model with two signals
β
(α1 + β + τ)2
<
(1 + ρ)2β
(2α2 + (1 + ρ)(β + τ))
2
(2α2 + (1 + ρ)(β + τ))
2 < (α1 + β + τ)2(1 + ρ)2
2α2 + (1 + ρ)(β + τ) < (α1 + β + τ)(1 + ρ)
2α2 < α1(1 + ρ)
2
1 + ρ
<
α1
α2
We know that 2/(1 + ρ) > 1. Therefore, we need α1 > α2 to support our empir-
47 Without loss of generality, for the sake of simplicity we assume that β is exogenous.
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ical finding that more speeches cause higher disagreement.48 We conclude that
if central banks talk more, they become less precise in their announcements.
For the second case – ii) a decrease in forecasters’ certainty τ – rename τ τ1 in
the model with one signal and τ2 in the model with two signals
β
(α + β + τ1)2
<
(1 + ρ)2β
(2α + (1 + ρ)(β + τ2))
2
(2α + (1 + ρ)(β + τ2))
2 < (1 + ρ)2(α + β + τ1)2
(2α + (1 + ρ)(β + τ2)) < (1 + ρ)(α + β + τ1)
2α + (1 + ρ)τ2 < (1 + ρ)α + (1 + ρ)τ1
2α + τ2 + ρτ2 < ρτ1 + ρα + τ1 + α
(1− ρ)α < (1 + ρ)(τ1 − τ2)
1− ρ
1 + ρ
<
τ1 − τ2
α
The left-hand side is always positive, and therefore, we need τ1 > τ2.49 In other
words, if there is only one signal, the forecaster is more certain about his own
prior than if he faces two signals. The more signals the central bank sends out,
the more confused the forecasters become, even though the signal precision does
not change.
iii) Change both the central bank’s signal precision and the forecasters’ certainty.
This leads to
β
(α1 + β + τ1)2
<
(1 + ρ)2β
(2α2 + (1 + ρ)(β + τ2))
2
(2α2 + (1 + ρ)(β + τ2))
2 < (1 + ρ)2(α1 + β + τ1)2
2α2 + (1 + ρ)(β + τ2) < (1 + ρ)(α1 + β + τ1)
2α2 + (1 + ρ)τ2 < (ρ + 1)τ1 + (ρ + 1)α1
2α2 < (ρ + 1)τ1 − (1 + ρ)τ2 + (ρ + 1)α1
2α2 < (ρ + 1)(α1 + τ1 − τ2)
2
ρ + 1
<
α1 + τ1 − τ2
α2
2
ρ + 1
<
α1
α2
+
τ1 − τ2
α2
48 α1 > α2 is a necessary but insufficient condition.
49 τ1 > τ2 is a necessary but insufficient condition.
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We know that 2/(1 + ρ) > 1. Thus,
1 <
α1
α2
+
τ1 − τ2
α2
α2 − α1
α2
<
τ1 − τ2
α2
α2 − α1 < τ1 − τ2
α2 + τ2 < α1 + τ1
Hence, if both forecaster uncertainty and the central bank’s signal precision
change, the two-signal case necessarily has higher overall uncertainty (sum of
the precision of signal and the forecasters’ certainty about their prior) than the
one-signal case in order to support our empirical result. This means that sending
more signals increases overall uncertainty.
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Appendix 5 Optimal transparency and its variance
We derive optimal transparency and its variance. For an optimum, we need a
squared term. The benchmark regression becomes
Yi,h,t = βTI · Transp.i,t + βTIsq · Transp.2i,t + Xi,h,t + εi,t
∂Yi,h,t
∂Transp.i,t
= βTI + 2 · βTIsq · Transp.i,t
!= 0
⇔ Transp.* = − βTI
2 · βTIsq
To calculate the variance of Transp.*, we use the Delta method.
The Delta method states the following (see, for example, Greene (2012)):
If
√
n(zn − µ) d→ N(0,Σ) and if g[zn] is a continuous and continuously differen-
tiable function with g′[µ] not equal to zero and not involving n, then
√
n (g[zn]− g[µ]) d→ N
(
0, G · Σ · G′)
where G = ∂g[zn]/∂zn.
Note that zn, µ and G are vectors and Σ is the covariance matrix.
Define
g[βTI , βTIsq] = − βTI2 · βTIsq
The variance of g[βTI , βTIsq] is given by
V
[
g[βTI , βTIsq]
]
= G ·V · G′
G =
(
∂g[βTI ,βTIsq]
∂βTI
,
∂g[βTI ,βTIsq]
∂βTIsq
)
=
( −1
2·βTIsq ,
βTI
2·β2TIsq
)
V =
(
V[βTI], Cov[βTI , βTIsq]
Cov[βTI , βTIsq], V[βTIsq]
)
⇒ V [g[βTI , βTIsq]] = V[βTI]4 · β2TIsq − βTI ·Cov[βTI , βTIsq]2 · β3TIsq + β
2
TI ·V[βTIsq]
4 · β4TIsq
We use this variance estimate to run t-tests of optimal transparency levels.
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Appendix 6 Construction of Central Bank Transparency
Index by Dincer & Eichengreen (2014)
In the following, we reproduce how the Central Bank Transparency Index was
constructed by Dincer & Eichengreen (2014). There are five subindices with
three subcomponents (questions) in each, which leads to 15 questions overall.
The points given to each subcomponent are summed up to reach the index level.
1 Political Transparency Political transparency refers to openness about pol-
icy objectives. This comprises a formal statement of objectives, including an
explicit prioritization in case of multiple goals, a quantification of the primary
objective(s), and explicit institutional arrangements.
1a Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an
explicit prioritization in case of multiple objectives?
No formal objective(s) = 0.
Multiple objectives without prioritization = 1/2.
One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1.
1b Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
1c Are there explicit contacts or other similar institutional arrangements be-
tween the monetary authorities and the government?
No central bank contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0.
Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract = 1/2.
Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank con-
tract although possibly subject to an explicit override procedure = 1.
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2 Economic Transparency Economic transparency focuses on the economic in-
formation that is used for monetary policy. This includes economic data, the
model of the economy that the central bank employs to construct forecasts or
evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the internal forecasts (model based or
judgmental) that the central bank relies on.
2a Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy pub-
licly available? (The focus is on the following five variables: money supply,
inflation, GDP, unemployment rate, and capacity utilization.)
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables = 0.
Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables = 1/2.
Quarterly time series for all five variables = 1.
2b Does the central bank disclose the macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy
analysis?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
2c Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts?
No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output = 0.
Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at
less than quarterly frequency = 1/2.
Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the
medium term (one to two years ahead), specifying the assumptions
about the policy instrument (conditional or unconditional forecasts) =
1.
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3 Procedural Transparency Procedural transparency concerns the way mone-
tary policy decisions are taken.
3a Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that de-
scribes its monetary policy framework?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
3b Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations
(or explanations in the case of a single central banker) within a reasonable
amount of time?
No or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0.
Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or at-
tributed) or explanations (in case of a single central banker), including
a discussion of backward- and forward-looking arguments = 1.
3c Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main
operating instrument or target was reached?
No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks) =
0.
Non-attributed voting records = 1/2.
Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1.
4 Policy Transparency Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy
decisions, together with an explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy
inclination or indication of likely future policy actions.
4a Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target
announced promptly?
No or only after the day of implementation = 0.
Yes, on the day of implementation = 1.
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4b Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy
decisions?
No = 0.
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially = 1/2.
Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments = 1.
4c Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy
meeting or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least
quarterly)?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
5 Operational Transparency Operational transparency concerns the implemen-
tation of the central bank’s policy actions. It involves a discussion of control
errors in achieving operating targets and (unanticipated) macroeconomic dis-
turbances that affect the transmission of monetary policy. The evaluation of the
macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy in light of its objectives is included
here as well.
5a Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy op-
erating targets (if any) have been achieved?
No or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.
Yes but without providing explanations for significant deviations = 1/2.
Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly)
perfect control over main operating instrument/target = 1.
5b Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) macroe-
conomic disturbances that affect the policy transmission process?
No or not very often = 0.
Yes but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroe-
conomic developments (at least quarterly) = 1/2.
Yes, including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually) = 1.
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5c Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome
in light of its macroeconomic objectives?
No or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.
Yes but superficially = 1/2.
Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in
meeting the objectives = 1.
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